Ambiguous Quality Changes from Taxes
and Legal Rules
Henry E. Smitht
Legal rules have long been analogized to taxes Conventional analysis has often assumed
that the mix of attributes within commodities is eitherfixed or costlessly measured. This Article explores the consequencesfor legal rules from dropping this neoclassical assumption of constant
quality. Instead,attributes are costly to measure, and substitutioncan occur by alteringlevels of attributes (such as durability) within commodities, service-S and activitie&The Article extends models
of quality under commodity-excise taxes to the more complex case of legal rules mandatingproduct enhancements (such as nondisclaimable warranties) and to rules aimed at pricing external
harms (such as pollution taxes). The Article shows that the range of possible quality effectS direct
and indirect,of legal rules is greaterthan that in the case of excise taxation and that quality changes
present issues of measurement cost that have been overlooked In particular,these quality responses provide alternativeand very different explanationsfor key data invoked by proponents of
behaviorallaw and economics and by advocates of liability rules over property rules The possibility of quality changes highlightsdifficult measurementissues in evaluatingthe efficiency and equity
of legal rules
INTRODUCTION

Economists and lawyers have long regarded legal rules through
the lens of taxation. To do so usually involves adopting a neoclassical
framework based on perfect competition in a market in which rational
actors buy and sell quantities of homogenous, well defined goods. For
those working in transaction-cost economics, of which law and economics is an offshoot, these assumptions can sometimes prove awkward for several reasons. First, as is now well known, the analogy to
taxation is itself a bit misleading. For example, legal rules mandating
product features may make products more attractive, even if buyers

would not have voluntarily paid full cost; taxes generally do not make
products more appealing. Originally, it was common to analogize legal
mandates to taxes, and to conclude that, as in the case of a tax, buyers
were better off to the extent that sellers were unable to "pass on" the
costs of the rule. More recently, it has been recognized that buyers are
usually better off when the costs can be "passed on" because the
higher resulting price may reflect the higher valuation buyers place on
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the product enhanced by the mandated attribute. For example, a

product with a mandated (nondisclaimable) warranty may be more
valued by the marginal buyer than was the pre-mandate product
without the warranty. Under certain circumstances of market failure,
this theoretically can lead the price increase of the new package to exceed the costs of the warranty (or other mandate).
More fundamentally, the assumptions of neoclassical economics
do not translate well into the transaction-cost framework in the first

place. The neoclassical world assumes zero transaction costs as part of
perfect competition, but the point of transaction-cost economics is to
focus on the explanatory role of positive transaction costs. In law and
economics, the solution to this problem has usually been to relax some

of the assumptions of the neoclassical model of perfect competition
pragmatically for the purpose of analyzing legal rules. But others have
suggested a more radical abandonment of neoclassical assumptions.
Most prominently, behavioral law and economics, drawing on the
emerging framework of behavioral economics, drops the traditional
assumptions of rationality.3 Thus, in the example of mandated warranties, buyers' lack of information or the framing effects emphasized in
1 See Richard Craswell, Passingon the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency andDistribution in
Buyer-SellerRelationships,43 Stan L Rev 361,362,368-85 (1991) (arguing that the intuition that
"buyers are more likely to benefit from a rule if sellers are unable to pass along much of their
costs" is false).
2
For example, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement
Act, Pub L No 93-637, 88 Stat 2183 (1975), codified as amended at 15 USC §§ 2301-12 (1994),
provides for nondisclaimable warranties in certain consumer transactions, and these provisions
preempt state laws providing less protection, § 2311(c). Also, some states have rendered the
UCC's implied warranties nondisclaimable in consumer transactions. See UCC § 2-314 (establishing an implied warranty of merchantability); Jean Braucher, An Informal Resolution Model
of ConsumerProduct WarrantyLaw, 1985 Wis L Rev 1405,1411 n 25 (noting that five states and
New York City prohibit disclaiming implied warranties). Many states' "lemon laws" mandate
nondisclaimable warranties. See Yvonne W Rosmarin and Jonathan Sheldon, Sales of Goodsand
Services app I (National Consumer Law Center 2d ed 1989) (table of lemon laws). In many jurisdictions, all residential leases contain a nondisclaimable implied warranty of habitability. See, for
example, Javins v FirstNationalRealty Corp, 428 F2d 1071,1080,1082 n 58 (DC Cir 1970) (stating that all housing leases covered by the Washington, D.C, housing code contain an implied
warranty of habitability that cannot be waived); Fairv Negley, 257 Pa Super 50,55-56,390 A2d
240,242 (1978) (holding that the warranty of habitability implied under Pennsylvania law may
not be waived); Anthony T.Kronman, Paternalismand the Law of Contracts,92 Yale L J 763,766,
766-86 (1983) ("In many jurisdictions, a nondisclaimable warranty of habitability is now implied,
as a matter of law, in every lease of residential property."); Myron Moskovitz, The Implied Warranty of Habitability:A New Doctrine Raising New Issues, 62 Cal L Rev 1444 (1974) (discussing
California's adopting an implied warranty of habitability).
3 See, for example, Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard Thaler, A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics,50 Stan L Rev 1471,1473-74 & n 3 (1998) (citing literature);
Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U Chi L Rev 1175, 1175-79 (1997) (arguing
that rational choice models, while useful, fail to take into account cognitive errors, motivational
distortions, social situations, and other factors that influence people's decisions); Symposium, The
Legal Implications of Psychology: Human Behavior, Behavioral Economics and the Law, 51
Vand L Rev 1495 (1998).
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behavioral law and economics might cause consumers to value the
mandated warranty by more than its cost. On this view, the absence of
the warranty in the pre-mandate market does not necessarily mean
that mandating the warranty is bad for consumers; in behavioral law
and economics consumers are not assumed to protect themselves
through rational choice.
In this Article, I will argue that analogizing legal rules to taxes
provides additional insights, but only after we drop a different neoclassical assumption that is quite common in the literature on legal
rules and not uncommon in the tax literature: that commodities and
transactions are homogeneous and vary only by price and quantity,
that is, that quality is fixed. Instead, I will assume crucially not only
that commodities and services are bundles of attributes that can vary
from specimen to specimen, but also that measurement of such attributes is costly.4 Although more recent consumer theory does regard
commodities as bundles of attributess the measurement-cost framework emphasizes the need to consume resources in measuring these
attributes; parties to a transaction must determine the attributes of the
product or service they are buying and selling, and such a determination is costly. Thus, the organization of transactions can be seen in
large part as solving the consequent problem of minimizing the sum of
measurement costs and the losses from leaving attributes unmeasured
(and unpriced). Because measurement costs are positive, not all attribute levels that constitute a product's quality will be priced, and, in
parallel fashion, when legal rules are imposed, not all such attributes
and margins will be specified in the legal rule. Consequently, transactions are subject to adjustment along many margins.
In the tax context, increasing evidence confirms Yoram Barzel's
theory that the effect of an excise tax will depend on the interaction of
the type of tax and the (endogenous) quality of the taxed item.6 Per4

These are the basic assumptions of the measurement-cost branch of transaction-cost

economics See, for example, Yoram Barzel, Measurement Cost and the Organizationof Markets,
25 J L & Econ 27 (1982) (stating that measurement of some attributes of goods is costly and may
result in errors and that markets have developed arrangements such as warranties, share con-

tracts, and vertical integration to address this problem); Roy Kenney and Benjamin Klein, The
Economics of Block Booking, 26 J L & Econ 497 (1983) (arguing that bundling products with
varying qualities can address the measurement cost problem).
5 See, for example, Jack Hirshleifer, Price Theory and Applications 155-56 (Prentice-Hall
3d ed 1984) ("[A] market commodity is ...desired ...only insofar as it is capable of yielding
satisfaction through its attributes."); Kelvin J. Lancaster, A New Approach to Consumer Theory,
74 J Pol Econ 132 (1966) (arguing that consumers derive utility from the properties or characteristics of goods rather than the goods directly); Sherwin Rosen, Hedonic Prices and Implicit
Markets:ProductDifferentiationin Pure Competition, 82 J Pol Econ 34,34 (1974) (outlining "a
model of product differentiation based on the hedonic hypothesis that goods are valued for their
utility-bearing attributes or characteristics"); George J. Stigler and Gary S Becker, De Gustibus

Non Est Disputandum, 67 Am Econ Rev 76,76-77 (1977).
6 See, for example, Yoram Barzel, An AlternativeApproach to the Analysis of Taxation, 84
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unit taxes that define the product taxed by reference to a proper subset of its attributes-as is usual-may lead to an increase in the untaxed attributes. Thus, to take the most well studied example, a perpack tax on cigarettes can lead to higher quality cigarettes in terms of
taste or length.7 By contrast, a specific commodity excise tax imposed
on an ad valorem (percentage-of-value) basis is usually expected to
lead to quality decreases: if attributes can be enjoyed outside the
taxed package and if the loss from the separation is outweighed by the
tax saved thereby, then the attribute will be severed. The (rump)
product will correspondingly show a quality decrease, and under certain circumstances this can even lead the price of the "commodity" after the imposition of the tax to be lower than the pre-tax equilibrium
price of the "commodity." For example, an ad valorem tax on "cars"
but not on compact disc players could lead to cars being sold without
compact disc players (and to induce some buyers who like listening to
music while driving to buy and install the compact disc player separately). Under these circumstances, the price rise due to the tax will be
mitigated by the price drop from the tax-induced lowering of car
quality. In some cases, the post-tax price will appear to be lower than
that of the pre-tax equilibrium.
In the following, I will build on the tax literature to provide a new
general framework of which taxes and legal rules fall out as subcases.
To do so, I will extend Barzel's model of excise taxes to include the
types of costs and benefits a legal mandate can present. Within this
framework, I will argue that endogenizing "quality" leads to a very
different view of the effects of legal rules than is conventionally
thought and will allow us additional understanding of how legal rules
and taxes are similar and different. I will show that relaxing the neoclassical assumption of homogenous commodities and giving measurement costs a more central place in the analysis of legal rules proJ Pol Econ 1177 (1976) (arguing that imposition of a tax leads to adjustments in the attributes of
a good in order to achieve tax avoidance); Cecil E. Bohanon and T.Norman Van Cott, Product
Quality and Taxation: A Reconciliation,19 Pub Fin Q 233 (1991) (arguing that in the usual case,
specific taxes increase product quality and ad valorem taxes decrease product quality); John Kay
and Michael Keen, Product Quality under Specific and Ad Valorem Taxation, 19 Pub Fin Q 238,

239 (1991) (arguing that "the effect of tax structure on product quality is determined by theprice
elasticity of the consumer's marginalvaluation of quality");Keith B. Leffler, Ambiguous Changes
in Product Quality,72 Am Econ Rev 956 (1982) (concluding that the effect on quality of imposing an excise tax is ambiguous). The apparent disagreements between some of these authors
stem from the differing assumptions made about demand in their models. Generally, the conflicting implications of some of these assumptions, noted in passing, support the main argument
here: that variable quality makes the effects of legal rules quite difficult to predict and that variable quality causes evidence about legal rules to be ambiguous.
7
Barzel, 84 J Pol Econ at 1193-95 & n 30 (cited in note 6); Russell S.Sobel and Thomas
A. Garrett, Taxation and Product Quality:New Evidence from Generic Cigarettes,105 J Pol Econ

880 (1997) (finding fault with previous cigarette studies that conflicted with Barzel's theory and
presenting evidence on generic cigarettes consistent with his theory). See also Part III.
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vides a range of insights and an alternative explanation to those provided in the behavioral law and economics and liability-rule literatures. Indeed, the issues I identify and the predictions this framework
makes do not even arise in conventional law and economics or even
behavioral law and economics, based as they are on the assumption of
constant quality.
Quality issues can arise in several legal contexts that might be
thought to work differently. In this Article, I will focus on two contexts
that exemplify the two major classes of tax-like legal rules: mandated
features of buyer-seller contracts and the legal control of externalities
such as pollution. In both contexts, I will show that potential quality
changes are of two types, what I call "direct" and "indirect." Direct
quality changes are those envisioned by officials that make the
achievement of the rule's objectives less costly. In the case of mandated product features, the mandated enhancement, say a warranty,
can give sellers an incentive to make products safer in order to reduce
the cost of the warranty. In the context of an externality such as pollution, abatement measures that firms take in response to an environmental tax allow the achievement of pollution reduction at lower cost
than by a simple contraction of output.
These unsurprising but desirable direct quality changes will be
contrasted with what I call "indirect" quality changes: quality may
change purely to lessen the incidence of the tax-like aspect of the legal
rule on the private actors and in a way that does not advance the
rule's purpose. For example, to the extent that consumers do not value
a mandated warranty, the excess of the cost over this valuation can,
like a tax, induce quality changes designed purely to lessen the incidence of this tax-like cost component.
In particular, several broad generalizations about indirect quality
changes will emerge. First, once quality is endogenized, we can expect
that, with adjustable quality, the deadweight loss from a legal rule is
likely to be smaller on the one hand, but the "benefits" aimed for are
also likely to be smaller than would be the case with "rigid" quality.
Moreover, the effects of legal rules on price and quantity are more difficult to predict, and the data are more ambiguous where quality is
variable and costly to measure rather than fixed.
Finally, the range of possible effects on quality from legal rules is
greater than that from taxes and makes problems of data and measurement more difficult. In buyer-seller cases in which more than the
cost of a legal rule has been "passed on"-cases that are sometimes
taken as evidence of a rule's efficiency-we have little assurance that
8 Compare Timothy Besley and Harvey S. Rosen, Sales Taxes and Prices:An Empirical
Analysis, 52 Natl Tax J 157,165-67 (1999) (finding some taxes to increase prices more than 100

The University of Chicago Law Review

[67:647

the rule actually is efficient or benefits consumers, because the price
rise may reflect a change in quality of the underlying "product" rather
than an increased willingness to pay for a simple sum of the premandate product plus the legally mandated feature. The post-mandate
data will not necessarily reflect the same underlying product as was
observed in the market equilibrium before the imposition of the mandate. Separating out the price effects stemming from the value to consumers of the warranty or other legal rule from those attributable to
indirect changes in product or transaction "quality" will pose very difficult econometric puzzles. Further, the impact on different consumers
of these quality changes may differ, leading to undesirable effects
from the standpoint of fairness.
In the other major context, that of taxes and liability rules aimed
at internalizing externalities, direct quality effects are fairly uncontroversial. Private actors who face liability will make their own internal
cost-benefit analyses which may result in altering quality-say adding
pollution abatement equipment to a production process-that makes
the achievement of the legal regime's goal of a cleaner environment
less costly. The cheapest-cost-avoider analysis draws strength from the
ability of liability rules to harness private information about costs.
But where harm is costly to measure, I will argue that indirect
quality effects can weaken the increasingly popular case for liability
rules over property rules based on their apparently lesser informational requirements. What I call the "informational-subset" argument
has taken the information-harnessing effect of liability rules even further by claiming that liability rules are generally superior to property
rules because they only require analysis of external harms, whereas
property rules and direct regulation require officials to assess and
weigh both benefits and the costs of achieving them.9 But indirect
quality changes can alter this supposed subset relationship. If actors
can easily alter the mix of attributes in their products or activities toward attributes that are difficult to measure, the informational-subset
argument no longer holds. In the pollution context, when polluters
can, for example, alter the mix of pollution toward harmful but harderto-measure components, some form of quantity regulation can be superior to the pricing mechanism so favored among a growing number
of commentators.

percent of the amount of the tax and advancing hypothesis of imperfect competition within a
rigid-quality framework); Craswell, 43 Stan L Rev at 361 (cited in note 1); _7s, Sunstein, and
Thaler, 50 Stan L Rev at 1505-08 (cited in note 3).
9 This argument has been made in its strongest form yet in Louis Kaplow and Steven
Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 Harv L Rev 713

(1996). For additional citations and discussion, see Part Ill.
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What we think of as a "product" or an "activity" is itself a function of measurement costs. Much of the following will be concerned
with substitutions against the tax-like component of legal rules. But
unlike substitutions between one product or activity and another, altering the levels of the various attributes of a product or an activity is
likely to be less visible because they are more costly to measure. It is
simply easier to measure numbers of toasters or volume of output
rather than the many attributes (wiring, chemical make-up, etc.) that
comprise them. As will emerge, theoretical analysis and empirical
studies conventionally proceed on the basis of a very simplified notion
of quality. But where the legal system itself may be imposing costs on
the quality attributes, there is little reason other than ease of measurement to ignore quality. How markets, officials, and economists
carve up the world into products and activities is all a function of
costly measurement.
In general, a framework based on endogenous quality highlights
the likelihood that information costs for devising an effective legal
mandate will be high, particularly where measurement costs lead "unregulated" parties themselves to leave attributes and margins unpriced. Measurement costs and the possibility of quality changes that
reflect them require more systematic attention. Part I supplies a
framework for analyzing direct and indirect quality changes induced
by taxes and legal rules. This framework is then applied in Part II to
mandated product improvements in buyer-seller contracts and in Part
III to rules like Pigovian taxes, liability rules, and subsidies that
"price" externalities. In Part IV, I show how indirect quality changes
can cause systematic ambiguities in the very data that would be used
ex post to evaluate the success of legal rules. Part V draws out the implications of measurement costs and variable quality for the design of
legal rules in terms of efficiency and equity.
I.

A FRAMEWORK FOR QUALITY CHANGES FROM TAXES AND

LEGAL RULES
This Article will explore the changes in quality that can be induced by taxes or legal rules. These quality effects will allow a more
complete picture of the analogy from legal rules to taxes.' Although
traditional commentary tends to analogize legal rules to taxes, the
10 In this Article, I will follow the usual practice in law and economics of using partial
equilibrium analysis; that is, I assume that prices outside the market I am considering are constant. Although partial equilibrium analysis can be problematic, it can be an appropriate first approximation. More importantly, the theme of this Article-that quality changes lead to ambiguities-is if anything reinforced by the possibility of feedback effects in a general equilibrium
framework. On partial versus general equilibrium analysis, see, for example, Andreu Mas-Colell,
Michael D. whinston, and Jerry R. Green, Microeconomic Theory 341-43,538-40 (Oxford 1995).
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analogy is more straightforward for some rules than for others. Indeed
liability rules, such as strict liability in tort, are straightforwardly
viewed as Pigovian taxes" with the proceeds going to the victims of
the externality. Less directly, laws that mandate product features in
buyer-seller relationships can be analogized to taxes. Previous analyses of taxes and legal mandates assume constant quality, which makes
the taxes and mandates look deceptively dissimilar. As I will show, the
range of possible effects on quality from legal rules is potentially
greater than in the case of revenue-raising commodity taxes, and, interestingly, the potential for these effects leads to ambiguities in the
data used to evaluate such rules.
After setting out traditional approaches to the passing on of the
costs of taxes and legal rules, I present my framework for exploring
the implications of variable quality on these issues. At the end of this
Part, I begin to apply these tools to the seemingly more familiar case
of Pigovian taxes and liability rules and find that, here too, endogenizing quality leads to the unexpected result that property rules can be
superior to liability rules more often than is recognized from within
the neoclassical, constant-quality framework.
A. Previous Approaches to Passing on Costs
A long tradition analogizes the imposition of a mandate on a
buyer-seller relationship to the imposition of an excise tax on the sale.
This deceptively attractive analogy masks important differences between taxes and legal rules, differences that are receiving increasing
attention in the traditional constant-quality framework.'2 In essence,
the analogy between taxes and legal rules often overlooks the increased willingness of the marginal consumer to pay for the product
or the service that has been enhanced by the mandated feature. Even
though possible shifts in demand do complicate the relationship between taxes and legal rules, I will later argue that the analogy becomes
useful once we consider quality changes.
According to the original analogy that ignores shifts in demand, a
legal rule will merely make the commodity or service in question
more costly. This "cost" is then treated just as would a tax or input factor price increase, as illustrated in Figures 1A and lB.3
11 Pigovian taxes are charges for units of an activity that are intended to internalize external costs and thereby bring actors' decisions closer to social optimality. See the sources cited in
note 70. See also, for example, Richard Comes and Todd Sandler, The theory of externalities,
public goods and club goods 68-69,72-81 (Cambridge 2d ed 1996).
12
See, for example, Craswell, 43 Stan L Rev 361 (cited in note 1); Lawrence H. Summers,
Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits, 79 Am Econ Rev (Papers and Proceedings) 177,

179-81 (1989). See also Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, 50 Stan L Rev at 1471 (cited in note 3).
13 The "cost" here may initially be different for different sellers. In a competitive market
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FIGURE IA
EFFEcTs OFA COST INCREASE WITH RELATIVELY ELASTIC DEMAND
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Where supply is relatively inelastic and demand relatively elastic,
as in Figure 1A, costs tend not to be passed on to consumers (i.e., P2P1 is small), but quantity falls by a large amount. But where, as in Figure 1B,supply is relatively elastic and demand inelastic, costs do tend
to be passed on (i.e., P2-P1 is large), but quantity does not fall much.
The former, Figure 1A, situation (inelastic supply, elastic demand)
tends to result in a large decrease in quantity and a small increase in
price, and the latter, Figure 1B, situation (elastic supply, inelastic demand) leads to a small decrease in quantity but a large increase in
price. This is fairly straightforward in the case of a tax, slightly less so
for input price increases. For the latter, the "cost" that can be passed
on in a competitive market is that of the sellers for whom the contribution of the input price increase to the marginal cost of their product
or service is least, after adjustments to production have been made.
In the case of legal rules, this simple view of cost is deceptive, because it is taken to mean that buyers are better off to the extent that
price does not rise. Just as a seller can pass on the cost of an excise tax
more or less depending on the elasticities of supply and demand, so, it
is argued, sellers will be able to "pass on" a portion of the cost of a legal rule depending on relative elasticities. From this it is concluded
that buyers are better off just to the extent that costs cannot be passed
on. However, unlike a tax or an increase in the price of an input, the
legal mandate may make the product more attractive to consumers.5
In particular, the more the marginal consumers' valuation of the
product increases after the mandate is imposed, the more demand will
shift outward, and this can explain a price increase.
Consider Figures 2A and 2B, which illustrate Richard Craswell's
analysis of the case of the inefficient and efficient warranty. 6 For now,

only the costs that the least-cost sellers face would be "passed on." See, for example, Richard
Craswell and Alan Schwartz, Foundationsof ContractLaw 39 (Oxford 1994). The assumption of
a competitive market is not essential to all the points that follow, but aids the exposition considerably and allows better comparison to previous work. In the following, I will note where this assumption matters.
14 The terminology of "pass on" is somewhat unfortunate, particularly in the case of legal
mandates. Following Craswell, I use "pass on" to mean that the rise in price exceeds the per-unit
cost increase. If a seller "passes on" less than 100 percent of his or her costs, this does not mean
that sellers suffer a loss or that they earn less than a competitive profit. A seller may have in-

stead reduced his or her per-unit production costs by producing less output. Craswell, 43 Stan L
Rev at 367 n 11 (cited in note 1).
15 See id at 362, 368-72, 383-85 (arguing that a mandated warranty causes an upward shift
in the demand curve equal to increased willingness to pay, reflecting the amount of consumer

benefit); Summers, 79 Am Econ Rev at 179-81 (cited in note 12).
16

See Craswell, 43 Stan L Rev at 368-72 (cited in note 1).
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In the case of the inefficient warranty, consumers' willingness to
pay increases less than the cost increase due to the warranty; demand
rises by less than the cost of the warranty (D2-D1 is less than c).18 Imposing the warranty results in a decrease in quantity and in a price increase (P2-Pi) that is less than c: not all of the cost (c) has been
"passed on." By contrast, in the case of the efficient warranty, consumers' increase in willingness to pay exceeds the cost of the warranty; demand rises more than cost (D2-D1 is greater than c). Quantity increases overall, and the price increase (P2-Pi)exceeds the cost
of the warranty (c). It appears that more than 100 percent of the cost
of the warranty has been passed on. (If demand increased by the same
amount as cost there would be no price increase or shift in quantity,
and exactly 100 percent of the warranty's cost would have been passed
on.) Thus, greater willingness to pay in the case of the marginal consumer means that more of the cost will appear to have been passed
on. And as long as inframarginal consumers19 value the warranty by at
least as much as the marginal consumers, overall consumer welfare is
increased.2
For example, a product such as a toaster with a warranty is more
attractive than the product without one. The demand for toasters will
shift up by the amount that the value to the marginal consumer of the
toaster with the warranty exceeds the value to the marginal consumer
of the toaster without the warranty. This outward shift in demand will
push both quantity and price upward. And, if the marginal consumer
values the warranty more than its cost, then the price increase will exceed the cost. But, as Craswell points out, in many cases, this complicates the simple tax analogy because now consumers are better off to
the extent that sellers can pass on the costs, as illustrated in Figure
2B.21 The shift outward in demand reflects increased willingness to pay
because of the value derived from the warranty. The more demand
shifts upward from its pre-warranty value, the more the price rise
would be regarded as a sign that at least the marginal consumers are
better off. Whether inframarginal consumers are better off will de17
This could either arise because all consumers do have the same valuation or because the
loss of economies of scale does not prevent sellers from differentiating the package by classes of
consumers, resulting in submarkets of homogeneous consumers. Id at 373 n 19.
18 The marginal consumer need not be the same set of consumers in each case. In some of
the following, I will assume that consumers all have the same valuation. This is of course inappropriate when considering the distributional aspect of legal rules.
19 Inframarginal consumers are those who value the package more than the equilibrium
price (which reflects the willingness to pay of the marginal consumer).

20

See Part V.A for further discussion.

21

Craswell, 43 Stan L Rev at 371 (cited in note 1).
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pend in turn on their valuations of the warranty relative to that of the

marginal consumers.2 Consumers "as a whole" will benefit if aggregate consumer surplus is increased.
The price increase can even exceed the cost of the legal rule, as it
does in Figure 2B, and it will if the marginal consumer values the
mandated attribute more than cost. Prior to the imposition of the legal
rule, consumers might be unaware of or misperceive the benefits of
the legal rule. If consumers do not know beforehand that they would
indeed value a warranty more than its cost and if a lawmaker knows
this, then one would have a paternalistic justification for the mandate.
If consumers were aware of the benefit once they started to enjoy it,
the price would rise to reflect this increased willingness to pay and the
paternalistic justification for the mandate would seem to receive its
confirmation.
As Craswell points out, framing effects, to the extent that they
exist for items like warranties, would work similarly, and this has become the foundation for more recent work in behavioral law and economics.?*Under framing theory, also known as the endowment effect, a
consumer would be willing to pay less for the entitlement than she
would have to be paid in order to give it up.2 ' In the framing scenario,
we have two demand curves, a lower one reflecting willingness to pay

and a higher one for willingness to accept. There is no a priori reason
22 Id at 372-85 (explaining that because consumers differ in their willingness to pay for a
warranty, some may be made better off by a warranty while others might be made worse off).
23 Id at 387-91 (suggesting that framing effects may make an efficiency analysis indeterminate). It is not clear that a consumer would feel that a legally mandated warranty is an "endowment" if she has not yet bought the product in question. See also Russell Korobkin, The Status
Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 Cornell L Rev 608, 611-12. 633-47 (1998) (finding endowment effect in default rules in a role-play experimental setting).
24 See Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, 47 Econometrica 263 (1979) (discussing basics of the endowment effect); Daniel
Kalmeman, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect
and the Coase Theorem, 98 J Pol Econ 1325 (1990) (arguing that endowment effects persist even
in market settings where the participants have opportunities to learn); Jack L. Knetsch, The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nonreversible Indifference Curves, 79 Am Econ Rev 1277
(1979) (reporting tests demonstrating the endowment effect); Amos Tversky and Daniel
Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice:A Reference-Dependent Model, 106 Q J Econ 1039
(1991) (presenting theoretical explanation for the endowment effect based on loss aversion). For
a sympathetic summary of work in this area, see Richard H. Thaler, The Winner's Curse: Paradoxes and Anomalies of Economic Life ch 6 (Princeton 1992). For a recent exchange on the robustness and the scope of the endowment effect, see Jason F Shogren, et al, Resolving Differences in Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept, 84 Am Econ Rev 255 (1994) (finding in
contrast to previous studies a convergence between willingness to pay and willingness to accept
for market goods with close substitutes but persistence of the divergence for nonmarket goods
with imperfect substitutes); Gwendolyn C. Morrison, Resolving Differences in Willingness to Pay
and Willingness to Accept Comment, 87 Am Econ Rev 236 (1997) (arguing that Shogren et al's
results are insufficient to reject endowment effect); Jason F Shogren and Dermot J. Hayes, Resolving Differences in Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept: Reply, 87 Am Econ Rev 241
(1997) (defending conclusions of earlier study and describing additional study).
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to favor one over the other in determining whether consumers in the
aggregate benefit from a mandate, but to the extent that framing is involved, the price of the product with
the warranty can exceed the old
2
price plus the cost of the warranty. '
Recently, behavioral law and economics has built on Craswell's
analysis in order to illustrate the implications of the endowment effect
for the design of legal rules.26 The prime empirical example is drawn
from employment law. One study is consistent with the interpretation
that more than 100 percent of the cost of mandated maternity health
coverage is "passed on" to female employees in the form of lower
wages 2' According to Sunstein, Jolls, and Thaler this can be seen as
evidence that workers' willingness to pay and willingness to accept diverge, just as the endowment effect literature would lead us to expect.2'
This is a possible interpretation, but it, like the literature it builds
on, implicitly assumes that the underlying product or service (or employment relation) does not change in quality in response to the cost
of the legal rule. I will argue that alternative views of such examples
are possible once we allow for quality changes along the many unpriced margins at the control of the transactors. The use of price
movements in behavioral law and economics turns out to be a thorny
problem, to which I return after presenting a framework for endogenizing quality changes.29
Direct and Indirect Quality Changes from Taxes and Legal Rules

B.

Consider the possibility of quality changes along margins unspecified by the legal rule. In the limiting case, a legal rule is not valuable at all to the consumer. This case is not so interesting in itself, but
it does allow one to consider some additional effects of quality
changes. In the limiting case, these quality changes would be like those
explored in the literature on excise taxes and on the closely related
25 The framing effect can lead to indeterminacy in efficiency analysis; the mandate will
look better if the outer demand curve reflecting an endowment is used to measure consumer

demand. See Craswell, 43 Stan L Rev at 387-91 (cited in note 1) (suggesting that consumers may
be willing to pay more for a warranty provided by the law than for a warranty not provided by
the law and that efficiency analysis is indeterminate if the warranty costs sellers an amount between these two values).
26 Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, 50 Stan L Rev at 1505-08 (cited in note 3) (stating that the
endowment effect may explain why wages fall by more than the cost of the benefit received in

certain cases).
27

Jonathan Gruber, The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits, 84 Am Econ Rev 622,

623 (1994).
28 Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, 50 Stan L Rev at 1505-08 (cited in note 3), citing Gruber, 84
Am Econ Rev 622 (cited in note 27).
29 See Parts IV.B and VB.2.
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Alchian-Allen proposition that fixed transportation charges cause
quality increases.n After explaining this limiting case, I will analyze the
more realistic case in which the attribute mandated by the legal rule
has some nonzero value to the marginal buyer.
Before proceeding, a word on terminology is in order. What we
commonly call "tax" laws can often have the effect of mandating features of a transaction or activity. For example, the Internal Revenue
Code's provisions on the qualifications for tax-exempt status and for
eligibility for deductible charitable contributions have the effect of
regulating the form in which charities and some other organizations
do business.' In the following, I will use "legal rule" to cover provisions (whether denominated "taxes," "regulations," etc.) that aim to
regulate or price behavior. I will show that these rules can be broken
up into a commodity-tax-like component and a remainder. Strictly
speaking, it is this remainder that distinguishes "legal rules" from
taxes.
1. Taxes under variable quality.
If we allow quality to vary, even the effects of an excise tax or a
transportation fee can lead to increases or decreases in price that are
unexpected on the traditional assumption that the quality of the
product or service is constant. These effects of variable quality will
depend on whether the tax in question is imposed on a per-unit or an
ad valorem basis. In either case, it will be assumed that the tax statute
does not specify every conceivable attribute of the commodity in
question but singles out the most important.n
Consider first a per-unit excise tax on one commodity. Take a well
known example, a tax imposed on light bulbs in which each unit is
taxed a flat amount. 3 Some attributes like durability are not mentioned in the tax statute. If so, then part of the tax can be avoided if
sellers and buyers shift to longer-lasting light bulbs-even if on a perunit-of-service basis the marginal cost of a light bulb is greater. That is,
the tax burden is lessened if one buys fewer bulbs that last longer; one
can enjoy light services at a lower cost per unit of service. Suppose, for
example, that before the tax, light bulbs that last one month cost $1
per bulb and those that last two months cost $2.25. Then lighting costs
30 See notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
31 See 26 USC § 501(c)(3) (1994) (specifying

criteria for tax-exempt organizations to be
eligible for deductible charitable contributions); 26 USC § 501(c)(2), (c)(4)-(c)(19) (1994) (specifying criteria for tax-exempt status of the organization itself).
32

This is a realistic assumption. See Barzel, 84 J Pol Econ at 1178 (cited in note 6) (noting

that, although the legal definition of a product or service may expand over time, it is still unlikely
to cover all relevant characteristics). See also Part V.
33

Barzel, 84 J Pol Econ at 1186-90 (cited in note 6).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[67:647

$1 per month with the short-lived bulbs and $1.12 ($2.25/2) with the
latter, and so the former, one-month bulbs will be chosen.'4 If a tax of
$0.75 per bulb is now imposed, the one-month bulbs will now cost
$1.75 per month of lighting, and the two-month bulbs will cost $1.50
(($2.25 + $0.75)/2) per month. With the tax, the two-month bulbs are
now cheaper to consumers and will be chosen, even though they are

more expensive to produce. Higher quality (here longer-lasting) light
bulbs will be substituted for the original light bulbs. Similarly, for light
bulbs that are typically used in pairs, single brighter (higher-quality)
bulbs might be substituted in order to evade the tax.

More generally, in a competitive market, assuming that buyers
know the quality attribute, the transactors are expected to minimize
the sum of the deadweight loss and the tax paid.n3 However, the dead-

weight loss in such cases comprises not only the familiar (but now
smaller) welfare-loss triangle but also a component representing the
extra production costs for the higher quality bulbs. This can be illustrated graphically as in Figure 3.

34 I am ignoring the age-old question of how many people it takes to change a light bulb
(and what their cost of doing so is). Alternatively the prices cited in the text can be considered to
include these costs.
35
In a perfectly competitive market, consumers costlessly measure attributes. In other
competitive markets, adjustment will occur to the extent that consumers value the attribute and
can cost-effectively be assured of getting what they pay for. Monopoly or oligopoly power can
add further complications that can also be relevant to the issue of quality. See, for example, Drew
Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, Game Theory 401-05 (1991) (discussing bargaining over an object
with unknown value in a bilateral monopoly situation); David Besanko, Shabtai Donnenfeld, and
Lawrence J. White, Monopoly and Quality Distortion Effects and Remedies, 102 Q J Econ 743
(1987) (discussing possible remedies for monopolist-induced quality distortions); R.H. Coase,
Durabilityand Monopoly, 15 J L & Econ 143 (1972); Kai-Uwe Kfihn and A. Jorge Padilla, Product line decisions and the Coase conjecture,27 Rand J Econ 391 (1996); Alan Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability,63 Va L Rev 1053, 1071-75 (1977) (discussing
conditions under which a monopolist is as responsive to consumer preferences in contract terms
as a nonmonopolist would be); A. Michael Spence, Monopoly, quality, and regulation,6 Bell J
Econ 417 (1975) (arguing that rate of return regulation best counters non-optimal quality setting
by monopolists). In particular, mandates might be strategic complements or substitutes with
quality in other markets. See Jeremy I. Bulow, John D. Geanakoplos, and Paul D. Klemperer,
Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements, 93 J Pol Econ 488 (1985) (analyzing how changes in an oligopolist's actions in one market affect other markets).
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FIGURE 3
DURABILITY SHIFt FROM PER UNIT EXCISE TAX
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The S(1) curve represents the supply of the low-durability bulb
and it is chosen in pre-tax equilibrium over the longer durability bulb,
whose supply curve S(2) is higher (more costly). With the imposition
of the tax, the low-durability curve shifts up by more (to ST(1)) than
does the high-durability curve (to ST(2)), because consumers buying
low-durability bulbs have to pay the tax more frequently. Since ST(2)
is lower than ST(1), higher quality is chosen after the tax, and the
quantity of service units falls less-to QT(2) rather than to QT(1)-

and the price per unit of service rises less-to PT(2) rather than
PT(1)-than expected on rigid quality. The welfare-loss triangle
(lighter shading) is smaller than it would be with rigid quality,6 but
there is an extra component of waste corresponding to the increased
production costs from evading the tax (darker shading). If transactors
were constrained to keep the durability of the light bulbs at the
original level, the conventional analysis-with its price, quantity, and
welfare-loss triangle-would hold. But, as long as some of the many
margins along which transactors can adjust are left unconstrained by
the tax statute, then the possibility of adjustment remains.
This adjustment to a per-unit excise tax is reminiscent of the Alchian-Allen proposition. According to this proposition, a transportation charge will lead to a substitution away from lower to higher qual36 Under rigid quality, the welfare-loss triangle would be the larger triangle extending from
Q(1) leftward all the way to QT(1), the quantity chosen under the tax and rigid quality.
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ity items.3 This leads to the (observed) effect of "shipping the good
apples out." If low-quality apples (ones that do not taste as good, etc.)
cost 25¢ to produce and high-quality apples cost 50 to produce, in the
local market one high-quality apple costs the same as two low-quality

apples. If shipping the apples across the country costs 250 per apple,
then this relationship is disturbed. Now a low-quality apple costs 50¢

and a high-quality apple costs 750. In the distant market a high-quality
apple costs the same as only one and one-half low-quality apples. The

relative prices have changed and because the high-quality apples are
relatively cheaper than they are in the local market, consumers in the

distant market will lessen apple consumption, but within apples consumed will substitute into high-quality apples from low-quality apples.m Demand for high-quality apples will be greater relative to the
demand for low-quality far away than close by the site of production,
and the average price paid for apples in the distant area will exceed
the sum of the cost of the average apple sold near the production site

and the transportation charge because relatively more high-quality,
expensive apples will be sold in the distant market. Just as in the case
of the per-unit tax on the producer side, the transportation cost causes

an adjustment on the consumer side-a substitution to higher quality.
Some taxes, in contrast, are imposed on an ad valorem basis and
their effects with endogenous quality are expected to be very different
from those in the case of the per-unit tax.39 Once again, in the most interesting case-and the one most parallel to legal rules-the tax statute does not specify all the possible attributes of the commodity and
so does not foreclose every avenue of adjustment. If a product-specific

See Armen A. Alchian and William R. Allen, University Economics 74-75 (Wadsworth
37
1964). For general discussions of the Alchian-Allen theorem, see Thomas E. Borcherding and
Eugene Silberberg, Shipping the Good Apples Out: The Alchian and Allen Theorem Reconsidered,86 J Pol Econ 131 (1978) (rebutting challenges to the Alchian-Allen theorem); Tyler Cowan
and Alexander Tabarrok, Good Grapesand Bad Lobsters:Applying the Alchian and Allen Theorem, 33 Econ Inquiry 253 (1995) (arguing that the Alchian-Allen theorem applies when costs are
imposed on a per-unit basis, but not when on a "fixed-fee" basis); John P.Gould and Joel Segall,
The Substitution Effects of TransportationCosts, 77 J Pol Econ 130 (1969) (arguing that the Alchian-Allen theorem need not hold when substitution effects are considered); John Umbeck,
Shipping the Good Apples Out Some Ambiguities in the Interpretation of "Fixed Charge",88 J
Pol Econ 199 (1980) (refuting Gould and Segall and asserting that the Alchian-Allen theorem
applies irrespective of substitution effects).
38
As has often been pointed out, even in the absence of income effects, this substitution
effect can theoretically be overcome by interaction with a third good. See, for example, Gould
and Segall, 77 J Pol Econ at 132-37 (cited in note 37) (explaining that the introduction of a substitute third good may result in a smaller proportion of the quality good being consumed in the
distant market); Borcherding and Silberberg, 86 J Pol Econ at 136-37 (cited in note 37) (analyzing the possibility of third-good effects and defending the empirical usefulness of Alchian-Allen
theorem).
39
See Barzel, 84 J Pol Econ at 1183-85 (cited in note 6) (arguing that an ad valorem tax
leads to a decrease in quality and may even lead to a price below the pre-tax price).
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tax is imposed on an ad valorem basis, attributes are only taxed if they
remain part of the package. But if they are dropped from the package,
they are not taxed. (This of course does not apply to an ad valorem tax
on every commodity in the economy.) Thus, if an ad valorem tax is
imposed on cars, it will be difficult to define "car" in such a way that
quality adjustment is not possible, because cars have thousands of attributes that consumers are sensitive to, either directly or indirectly. If
the tax is ad valorem, transactors will have an incentive to drop attributes from the car as long as the separation is less costly than the tax
saved. So we would expect that air conditioners and compact disc
players might be dropped from the commodity called "car" and sold
separately, so that they do not face the tax. As long as, to the marginal
consumer, the pre-tax advantage of including the attribute in the
package over selling it separately is less than the tax saved by eliminating the attribute plus the decrease in price of the product resulting
from the dropped attribute, such attributes would be dropped.4° We
expect, if anything, a lowering of quality in response to an ad valorem
tax. Again, the quantity of service units should drop by less than it
would in the fully constrained case of the conventional analysis, but,
unlike with the per-unit tax, this time we expect price to be less than
conventionally expected, as illustrated in Figure 4.
FIGURE 4
EFFECTS OF AN AD VALOREM TAX
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40 Id. Post tax, consumers might purchase the item separately and install it or might shift
their consumption elsewhere.
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In Figure 4, lower quality leads to a lower price than expected
under rigid quality. Here S(A) represents the supply of A alone, S(P)
the supply of the package that contains both A and B, S(A + B) is the
supply of A and B separately (the vertical sum of S(A) and S(B)).
Similarly, ST(A) is the (upwardly shifted) supply curve of A alone after the imposition of the tax, ST(A + B) is the supply of A and B separately after the tax, and ST(P) is the supply of the A-plus-B package
after the tax. The separate supply curve shifts up (to ST(A + B)) by
less than the supply curve for the package (to ST(P)), causing post-tax
equilibrium quantity to fall less with variable quality (from Q1 to
QT(A + B)) than it would if quality were constrained to the pre-tax
equilibrium product with both A and B (from Q1 to QT(P)). That is,
QT(A + B) exceeds QT(P). The price corresponding to the variablequality equilibrium quantity QT(A + B) is lower here than the price
corresponding to the fixed-quality equilibrium quantity QT(P). In extreme cases, the price can fall below the equilibrium price before the
imposition of the tax. This is not possible on the conventional view
where the price will, if anything, rise (and would remain the same only
in the case where the elasticities dictate that none of the tax can be
"passed on" to the buyer). Because the adjustment to the tax is completely analogous to the adjustment to a rise in a factor price, a competitive market can be expected to supply the quality level that minifrom reduced
mizes the sum of the tax paid, the welfare loss (triangle)
41
production, and the loss of efficiency in production.
It is worth stressing that both the quality changes themselves and
the fact that they differ for per-unit and ad valorem taxes stem ultimately from the costliness of measuring and specifying margins. In
particular, if all attributes could be specified perfectly in the definition
used in the legal rule, then no adjustment would be possible, and
quality would not be an issue. Generally, if all quality is fixed-by the
tax statute or by natural constraints-and so only quantity is allowed
to vary, then per-unit and ad valorem taxes are equivalent and would
framework.4
be treated correctly on the traditional rigid-quality
2. Legal rules under variable quality.
Turning now to legal rules, here too, rigid quality would imply no
difference between legal rules that impose costs on a per-unit or an ad
valorem basis. Rigid quality-either from perfect specification of attributes in the legal rule or from the natural unavailability of multiple,
variable attributes-would imply the correctness of the traditional
Id at 1183; see also Leffler, 72 Am Econ Rev at 957-60 (cited in note 6).
Barzel, 84 J Pol Econ at 1185 (cited in note 6); Kay and Keen, 19 Pub Fin Q at 242 (cited
in note 6).
41

42

2000]

Ambiguous Quality Changes

quantity-price view of legal rules. But, in a world of positive measurement costs, quality changes do become an issue.
Although in many cases a legal mandate will provide some benefits to consumers and will impose some costs that are avoidable
through quality changes, it is useful analytically to begin with the limiting case in which consumers do not value the mandated attribute at
all. This case is not all that interesting in itself since it may be rare, but
it is useful to consider it for analytical purposes: even where consumers do value the warranty somewhat, quality shifts of some sort may
occur and serve to obscure how much value consumers do derive. In
evaluating the effects of the warranty on price, quality shifts can produce noise in the signal.
For example, consider a law that mandates that toasters carry a
warranty against faulty wiring. Say toasters that last one year cost $10
without the warranty and $17.50 with the warranty. Toasters that last
two years cost $22.50 without the warranty and $30 with the warranty.43 Toasting services will now be cheaper with the longer lasting
toaster ($15 per year) than with the shorter-lived one ($17.50 per
year). This makes the toaster example just like the tax on light bulbs.
Now, consider two respects in which the mandate can be different
from the tax. First, the mandate may lead to efforts to improve the
wiring on toasters: this is an example of what I call direct quality effects.
Now consider the second, indirect type of quality effect. Consumers may value the warranty (and the better wiring if that occurs). If so,
the cost of the warranty will be lower and the consumer's valuation
will be higher. Say that the marginal consumer values the warranty at
$2.50 regardless of toaster durability (an assumption made for ease of
exposition that will be relaxed later"). Then the tax-like aspect of the
warranty is only $5 ($7.50-$2.50); note that the warranty is inefficient.
Without the mandate consumers will not choose the warranty, but after the mandate they can buy either a one-year toaster that they value
at $12.50 for a price of $17.50, or they can buy a two-year toaster that
they value at $25 for a price of $30. Toasting services then cost $17.50
per year with the low-quality (one-year) toaster and cost $15 per year
($30/2) with the high-durability toaster. Again, we expect a shift toward more durable toasters even though these cost more (and are
43 The warranty might be more or less expensive per toaster as durability increases. I return to this issue shortly.
44 The analysis is complicated but not changed in any essential way if this assumption is
dropped. A warranty could produce constant benefits if toasters of greater durability presented
the same level of risk as a one-year toaster, say, because greater durability lessened the risk and
hence the value of the warranty per unit of toasting services. For a more general analysis, see Part
II.A.
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valued less) in the pre-mandate equilibrium. The excess of the warranty's cost over the consumer's valuation functions as a per-unit tax
that may increase quality.
In the case of a non-cost-justified mandate, a competitive market
can be expected to supply that combination of quality attributes that
will minimize the sum of the net cost of the mandate (marginal cost
minus marginal benefit), losses from decreased production, and losses
from productive inefficiency. That is, with respect to the net cost that
the mandate imposes, the quality response will work as in the case of
an input factor price rise or an excise tax.
Notice too that in this example, the price of toasters has risen not
just by the cost of the warranty (from $10 to $17.50), but by more than
the cost of the warranty-by $20 ($30 - $10), which is greater than
$7.50. Interestingly, since the price increase is greater than the cost of
the mandate it appears that more than the cost of the mandate has
been "passed on," making the mandate look efficient. But by hypothesis, the mandate is inefficient: the price consumers pay for the
warranty exceeds the value the marginal consumer places on it. Thus,
variable quality can lead to price increases that look like the case of
an efficient legal rule in which more than the full cost is passed on.
This ambiguity has not been recognized because quality is assumed
not to vary, but it is a potential problem, as I will show.5
Indirect quality effects are not limited to legal rules that mandate
features of a buyer-seller transaction. Many of the rules most clearly
related to taxes are those that seek to internalize externalities. A
Pigovian tax and a liability rule both aim to impose a.price on an externality; by making an actor pay for the harm caused, the externality
is internalized. By contrast, property rules are backed up by sanctions:
officials decide what entitlements are and violators are subject to a
fine that causes their private costs to take a discontinuous jump at the
point where the violation begins.4 That is, under property rules, actors
are not subject to any officially imposed costs or punishments up to a
certain point of an activity, but then are subject to severe costs or
punishments after they pass that point, with the theoretical goal of the
45 See Parts II and V Because this Article is about quality changes, it will focus on the results of mandating a feature of a product that was not provided by the pre-mandate market.
Warranties themselves are used in part to solve informational problems where consumers find it

costly to measure quality at the point of sale. See, for example, Barzel, 25 J L & Econ at 32-34
(cited in note 4); George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 Yale L J

1297,1303-07 (1981).
46
I am following the formulation in Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 Colum L Rev
1523, 1524 (1984) (defining a sanction as "a detriment imposed for doing what is forbidden")
(emphasis omitted). See also Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic
Analysis 68-69 (Yale 1970) (outlining framework of price-like specific deterrence and sanctionlike general deterrence); Part I.

2000]

Ambiguous Quality Changes

officials being to eliminate all of the harmful activity in excess of that
point. The difference between the Pigovian tax and the liability rule is
that in the former the government gets the money whereas in the latter victims are compensated. It is often thought that Pigovian taxes
and liability rules possess a great advantage over property rules in that
they require less information." Officials need only know the level of
external harm to "price" it with a liability rule or Pigovian tax, but to
use a property rule officials must know the right quantity of the externality, which can normally only be determined by weighing costs and
benefits. Thus, the fact that pricing mechanisms like liability rules only
require a proper subset of the information required for property rules
is taken as a strong argument for liability rules.
But this view rests on an incomplete picture of quality changes.
For example, consider environmental legislation that aims to reduce
pollution by imposing a fee on factory emissions. Unsurprisingly, direct quality changes, such as use of abatement equipment, can make
achieving the internalization of the externality less costly than otherwise. But indirect quality changes-those that simply reduce the incidence of the tax or legal rule to the private actor-can complicate the
information costs. For example, if pollution from a set of firms consists
of component A and component B, and A is the problem from current
production, it might appear that pricing A is superior than devising the
quantity of pollution to allow (as under a property-rule approach).
But this may not be true when two conditions hold: First, if the mix of
components can be shifted towards B especially at higher pollution
quantities and, second, if measuring the amount of B is more costly
than measuring the amount of A. The property-rule approach will be
superior where the costs from the shift in quality towards increased B
outweigh the consequences of errors in determining the allowable
pollution quantity under the property-rule regime. In some cases, hybrid regimes will be called for, as we will see." In cases where the substitution is into something that itself produces externalities and where
these are costly to measure, a Pigovian tax or liability rule may cause
measurement costs to rise.
II. MANDATES
Mandates are generally considered to be an alternative to taxation and public provision that can achieve similar goals. The advantage
of a mandate is that it allows regulated individuals and entitles more
flexibility in deciding how to achieve the goal set by officials. Public
finance teaches that it is often useful to analyze a legal rule that imSee note 83 and accompanying text.
48 See Part Il.
47
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poses a mandate (such as a mandatory warranty on a product sold to
consumers) as the equivalent in some sense of a "benefits tax" on the
transaction." It is as if consumers are taxed and the revenue is spent
on the product enhancement in question (for example, the warranty).

Again, as several authors have recognized, the -net rate of this tax is
equal to the difference between the cost of the mandate and the value
placed on it by the marginal consumer. ° As in the example above, if a
mandatory warranty adds $7.50 to the cost of a toaster but the marginal consumer values the warranty at $2.50, the equilibrium will

change as it would to a $5 tax on toasters-not as it would to a $7.50
excise tax.

What this literature ignores is the possibility of variable quality,
and in particular what I am calling "indirect" quality effects. If quality
is assumed to be constant, then the tax-like component (the $5 tax in
the toaster example) will cause the same quantity shift and the same
deadweight loss whether it is imposed on a per-unit basis ($5 per $10
toaster as assumed in the example) or on an ad valorem basis (say, 50
percent of a toaster that otherwise costs $10). But, once quality is allowed to vary, it may matter very much whether the $5 tax-like component of the mandate is imposed on a per-unit or an ad valorem basis. The next sections take up in turn the cases of mandates with a perunit cost and those with an ad valorem cost.
A. Per-Unit Mandates

Consider now the case of a legal mandate that imposes costs on a
per-unit basis. We need to be concerned with three sets of attributes.51
49 See, for example, Summers, 79 Am Econ Rev at 180-81 (cited in note 12) (analyzing
mandates as benefits taxes in transactions within a rigid-quality framework). See also, for example, Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J L & Econ 211 (1976);
Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation,2 Bell J Econ & Mgmt Sci 22 (1971) (arguing that
regulation is used to redistribute wealth and can be considered a branch of public finance).
50 See, for example, Summers, 79 Am Econ Rev at 180-81 (cited in note 12) (stating that
"mandated benefits represent a tax at a rate equal to the difference between the employer's cost
of providing the benefit and the employee's valuation of it, not at a rate equal to the cost to the
employer of providing the benefit").
51 In this section I extend the original Barzel tax model to include the warranty as a separate attribute. Barzel, 84 J Pol Econ at 1179-82 (cited in note 6) (considering a per-unit tax and
its effects on specified characteristics, unspecified characteristics, and the commodity as a whole).
For a more formal version of this extended model, see the Appendix. This extension increases
the number of cases that need to be considered. The assumptions behind the Barzel model reduce its generality, see, for example, Kay and Keen, 19 Pub Fim Q at 238-39 (cited in note 6);
Leffler, 72 Am Econ Rev at 964 (cited in note 6), but it does seem to capture the empirically
most significant cases. (The same occurs in the case of the Alchian-Allen theorem.) As noted in
the text, the additional possibilities precluded by some of the assumptions made here do not affect the main argument that recognizing endogenous quality makes the effects of a legal rule
more complicated and the evidence must be regarded as more ambiguous than in the conventional rigid-quality framework.
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Into the first class fall those attributes that are specified in the legal
rules; these include, for example, attributes used to define the "product" for which the legal rule mandates a warranty.5 2 In the second class
are those attributes in the pre-mandate equilibrium product that are
not specified by the legal rule; these are like the durability of the light
bulbs or toasters in the examples above. In the third class are the
mandated attributes themselves, for example, the nondisclaimable
warranty.
To make things simple, I will assume that each of the attributesspecified, unspecified, and mandated-contributes to the marginal
value of a product unit in a separable way.53 Also, I will concentrate on
cases in which taxed attributes and untaxed attributes are either substitutes, independent, or (at most) weak complements; only strong
complements are excluded.4 For now, I assume that all consumers
have the same valuation (this will be relaxed later) and that there are
no income or selection effects." These will sometimes be empirically
reasonable assumptions, but at any rate they do not affect the main
argument here. Unless all the adjustments cancel each other out,
which is not likely, the possibility that there might be yet more complicated quality adjustments only reinforces the point made here: that
quality changes will lead to greater ambiguity of results from legal
rules than is usually thought.
In the equilibrium before the imposition of a legal mandate, each
attribute's marginal contribution to the value of the commodity equals
its marginal contribution to the cost of the commodity. The warranty
will impose a marginal cost consisting of components that vary with
the level of attributes other than the warranty and a fixed cost component once the product is chosen. Unlike with the usual per-unit tax,
52

Alternatively, the statute might use a word like "toaster" waiting for courts to fill in the

meaning. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that every attribute, such as durability, will be incorporated
into the definition of "toaster" regardless of the extent to which the definition is supplied by the

legislature, administrative agencies, or the courts. However, these different institutions might favor different levels of detail.
53 That is, I examine an additive transformation of the supply schedules for each class of at-

tributes. Relative levels of "untaxed" attributes remain the same (without any important loss of
generality). For now, I also assume that there are no cross-effects or differential interactions between the attributes and commodities outside the "product" in question. These assumptions are

commonly made in the literature following Barzel, 84 J Pol Econ at 1181 n 7 (cited in note 6),
and they are the assumptions that have been found necessary to support the Alchian-Allen theorem. For a framework that drops some of these assumptions, see Leffler, 72 Am Econ Rev at 956
n 2,964-65 (cited in note 6).
54 Otherwise an Edgeworth-paradox-like effect can arise, in which a tax on one attribute
can cause a decrease in both that attribute and a strong complement, leading to an overall de-

crease in quality and price. See Leffler,72 Am Econ Rev at 964 & n 26 (cited in note 6).
55 That is, I assume that the tax-like component of the net benefits do not raise or lower income enough to affect demand. Also, for now I assume homogenous consumers and no unravelling through adverse selection.
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the marginal value of the warranty can be nonzero; the warranty confers a marginal benefit that likewise comprises a variable component
and a fixed component. Now, with the imposition of the warranty, a
new equilibrium will emerge at which the sum of the marginal costs of
all the attributes (including the marginal cost of the warranty attribute) equals the sum of the marginal values of the attributes.
Two key differences between the legal rule and the excise tax become apparent. First, as mentioned earlier, unlike the tax, the warranty does not simply impose a cost with no corresponding benefit.
Thus, the effect of the warranty appears on both sides of the equation
of marginal benefit and marginal cost. Second, the levels of the attributes of the pre-mandate commodity can affect the cost and benefit of
the warranty attribute. That is, in the case of the per-unit excise tax,
once the product is chosen the tax level is constant (for example, $0.75
per light bulb), but with a mandate such as a warranty, altering the
level of attributes within the product itself can have an effect on the
marginal cost and value of the warranty.56
Returning to the three classes of attributes identified at the beginning of this Part, some of the n attributes of the original commodity
will be specified in the definition of the commodity for purposes of
the legal rule but others will not (just as in the case of the tax). Thus of
the n attributes the first k will be specified and k + 1,..., n will not. For
ease of exposition, the former, specified, attributes can be reduced to
one composite attribute A and the latter, unspecified, attributes can be
grouped into composite attribute B.5 At the new post-mandate equilibrium, the new price will equal the sum of the marginal costs of the
attributes (specified, unspecified, and mandated) which will equal the
sum of the corresponding marginal values.
At this point, results depend on the relative sizes of the various
components of marginal benefit and cost. Most significantly, the issue
is whether the warranty itself is less than, more than, or exactly costjustified. The following two subsections discuss these issues in greater
detail and can be skipped without loss of understanding. Conversely,
those seeking more formal versions of these arguments can find them
in the Appendix.

56 Thus, I am modeling the interaction of the attributes with the warranty. This does seem
to be empirically important, as noted in Part V.B.2. If necessary, similar treatment could be given
to any of the original attributes that show similar interaction effects.
57 That is, the relative levels of the attributes within each set do not change. Without this
assumption, the argument goes through but no additional insights are gained.
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1. Non-cost-justified warranty.
In this first case, the marginal value of the warranty is less than its
marginal cost. This was the case in the toaster example above," in
which the marginal consumer valued a $7.50 warranty at $2.50, for a
$5 tax-like excess. What makes this case interesting is that variable
quality can make this case look deceptively more like one in which the
mandated attribute, the warranty, has net value to the marginal buyer.
Under the conventional view, the demand curve simply shifts up by
less than does the supply curve. But what looks like such a shift in the
demand curve may be the effect of increased quality as a cost-evading
device.
Whenever a warranty with a per-unit cost structure is not costjustified, it does act like a tax in the sense that, under the assumptions
adopted here, it will lead to a decrease in the quantity of the commodity as a whole, which in turn means that we move downward along
the marginal cost curves of each of the attributes. 9 That is, for these attributes, the situation is like that for the whole product in Figure 2A
above: the demand (marginal value) curve shifts up by less than does
the supply (marginal cost) curve, leading to a decrease in quantity and
a corresponding move backwards down the marginal cost (supply)
curve.

It is important to keep in mind that variable quality can manifest
itself in both direct and indirect ways. Not surprisingly, altering the
level of an attribute can make a warranty more or less costly, leading
to what I will call the "direct" quality effect. For example, if a warranty is required on toasters, increasing the level of the wire insulation
attribute may decrease the cost of the warranty. More indirectly, to the
extent that the warranty is not cost-justified, it acts like a specific excise tax, which can lead to a cost-evading quality increase. In this latter, "indirect" case, the increase in quality does not directly make the
warranty less costly per "unit" of the product (as defined by the law)
but it does lessen its incidence. Through the quality shift, the same
warranty cost per legal "unit" is concentrated on fewer but higherquality (in the example above, higher-durability) units.
In the Appendix, I consider a range of subcases of the non-costjustified warranty. Generally speaking, the possible quality effects of
the non-cost-justified warranty outnumber those of the excise tax.
There are three broad classes of cases. First, there might be no interaction between the level of A attributes (specified and unspecified) and
the cost of the warranty. If so, then the warranty acts like a per-unit
58

See text accompanying notes 43-45.

59 That is, for each attribute the marginal costs are increasing, as they are in the case of the
whole product in Figures 1 and 2.
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excise tax and we expect, if anything, a quality increase of the indirect
sort.o
Second, what I will call the warranty effect-the net marginal
contribution of the attribute to the value of the warranty-might be
positive. If so, there will be an incentive to increase quality in a way
consistent with the policy of the warranty. For example, wiring in a
toaster might be improved in the presence of a mandated warranty.
Thus, where the "warranty effect" of an attribute is positive there will
be a trend for an additional direct quality change in addition to the
pressure for indirect quality changes from the tax-like extra cost of the
warranty.'
Third, this warranty effect might be negative: the attribute contributes in a marginally negative way to the value of the warranty. One
might think that there would be an incentive to reduce the attribute,
and there is some pressure in this direction. But against this, we must
consider the "product effect," the marginal contribution of the attribute to the value of the product. If one reduces the level of the attribute, by assumption this will reduce the cost of the warranty, but it may
also destroy product value. The key is which of these happens faster.
In the Appendix it is shown that depending on whether the positive
product effect or the negative warranty effect dominates, we might get
an increase or a decrease in quality. The possibilities are summarized
in Table 1.
TABLE 1
NEGATIVE WARRANTY

ErFEcr

Product Effect Dominates
Unspecified
Attributes

Appendix Case (d)
Quality increase but less

Warranty Effect
Dominates
Appendix Case (e)
Quality decrease

than for excise tax

Specified Attributes

Appendix Case (f)

Appendix Case (g)

No quality change

No quality change

Within each class of attributes, unspecified and specified, different attributes may fall under different subcases. The net effect cannot
be determined a priori, and the range of possible quality changes exceeds that for a per-unit excise tax.

60 See case (a) in the Appendix.
61 See cases (b) and (c) in the Appendix.
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2. Cost-justified warranty.
Here the marginal value of the warranty equals or exceeds the
marginal cost. Consider the truly cost-justified warranty, whose marginal value exceeds its marginal cost. In part, this is the case discussed
briefly above in which, for some reason like framing, the pre-mandate
market equilibrium did not produce a warranty valued more than its
cost." In such cases, after the warranty is mandated the demand curve
shifts outward by more than the supply curve does and we get a quantity and price increase. Can quality changes happen here too? Yes, because while the warranty may be overall cost-justified, it may impose
costs on unspecified margins in one of two ways. First, the warranty
can simply cause that attribute to be more costly (that is, to shift the
attribute's marginal cost curve outward). Second, the quantity increase
induced by the (overall valued) warranty can lead in the case of an individual attribute to a move beyond the point at which marginal cost
equals marginal benefit for that attribute. That is, the quantity shift in
the overall product causes a movement along the marginal cost curve
for the attribute that results in a larger rise in cost than the corresponding additional benefit from movement down the marginal value
curve.

Consider a mandated warranty on a toaster like that in the earlier
example except that it is cost-justified overall.63 That is, again, a oneyear toaster costs $10 without a warranty and $17.50 with a warranty,
and a two-year toaster costs $22.50 and $30, respectively. Suppose the
marginal consumer values the toaster-warranty that costs $7.50 at
$9.50, rather than at $2.50 as before. In this case demand for the package would seem to shift outward by $2. However, it might be the case
that the warranty's costs are concentrated on a subset of the toaster's
attributes in one of two ways. First, increasing the wiring safety attribute might cost $1 but save $2 in warranty cost, in which case that attribute will increase. Or, similarly, the warranty might make the presence of another attribute costly, such as a high-heat setting, which
could be removed. These quality changes result from a shift upward of
the marginal cost (supply) curve for the attribute. Second, the increase
in quantity of toasters demanded will cause a shift upward along the
supply curve of toasters. But if we think about a toaster as a collection
of individual attributes, the marginal cost of certain attributes might
rise faster than others. For example, the cost of a material or a component might become expensive-chrome plating grows scarce and costs
$1 more per toaster because of toaster demand-which might lead to
a substitution within the "toaster" towards more plastic and fewer
62 See text accompanying note 24.
63 See text accompanying notes 43-45.
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chrome plated surfaces. This latter type of quality effect stems from a
movement along the existing marginal cost curve of the attribute.
Finally, the marginal value of the warranty could equal the marginal cost. Here we have a wash: the demand curve shifts up just as
much as the supply curve does. The result is no change in quantity, but
an increase in price. Again, individual unspecified margins could require adjustment for the reasons just described in the previous case of
the non-cost-justified mandate with per-unit cost.
B. Ad Valorem Mandates
Taxes may be levied on a specific ad valorem basis, and some legal rules can impose costs on products or services on what amounts to
an ad valorem basis as well. As Barzel has shown, one should expect a
specific ad valorem excise tax to tend to reduce quality. Attributes
are subject to the tax only if they are part of the package. As long as
separating attributes out of the package is less costly than the tax
saved, they will be removed from the package. The "product" will decline in quality and price will be lower than expected in the rigidquality framework.
Similarly, when legal rules impose costs on an ad valorem basis,
we should expect pressure towards lower quality from the incentive to
separate out unspecified attributes from the product (or service). But,
again, the impact of a legal rule is likely to be more complicated than
that of the corresponding tax, because increasing the level of an attribute, specified or unspecified, can in some cases reduce the cost of
what is otherwise an ad valorem mandate. A priori it is not clear
whether the overall trend will be toward raising or lowering the level
of an attribute (or of quality more generally). The effect of the ad valorem-type mandate that calls for lower quality to avoid the tax-like
aspect can either be countered or reinforced. It is countered (wholly
or partially) where there is an incentive to increase quality in order to
lower the cost of the warranty. For example, increased safety through
an increase in an attribute can, over some range, lower the cost of a
warranty more than it adds to the ad valorem cost. On the other hand,
the ad valorem effect can be reinforced when the reduction of an attribute not only saves the tax-like cost on that attribute but also lowers the cost of the warranty.
None of these effects is as surprising as the incentive for higher
quality that comes from the mere imposition of a mandate with a perunit cost,a but these effects do underline the difficulty in evaluating
64 See Barzel, 84 J Pol Econ at 1183-85 (cited in note 6). A generalad valorem tax on all
commodities in the economy will not have this effect.
65 See Part II.A.
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the welfare and distributional effects of a legal rule that imposes costs
on an ad valorem basis. More generally, we would also want to know
in evaluating a rule whether it imposes costs on a per-unit basis, an ad
valorem basis, or some combination of the two.
Consider the (generalizable) example of a warranty that imposes
its costs initially on an ad valorem basis. For example, the legally mandated warranty provides for a nonwaivable repair remedy, and repairs
are costly in proportion to the quality present in the product. This ad
valorem legal rule imposes costs on attributes at rate c and provides
benefits at rate v"'.
The ad valorem tax and the legal rule that imposes costs on an ad
valorem basis show some important similarities. Each makes lower
quality attractive; reducing levels of B allows some of the cost to be
avoided because B is only exposed to the cost of the rule as part of the
product. Of course, as in the per-unit case, the value might exceed the
cost (v '> c), in which case we would expect the shift outward in demand discussed by Craswe 6 and emphasized in behavioral law and
economics.7 But when the cost exceeds the value (c > v'), then the
rule operates as a tax to the tune of the excess, that is, at the rate
cW- vw.We expect that B will be decreased to avoid the cost of the rule
as long as any inconvenience of doing so is outweighed by the tax
saved. If the pre-mandate benefit from selling B as part of the package
(as opposed to separately) is less than the marginal cost of the attribute times the net rate of cost, then B may be dropped from the "product" completely.
There are several important differences between the legal rule
with an ad valorem cost and the specific ad valorem tax. First, it is
worth emphasizing that for the corresponding ad valorem tax, the
analogue to vw would be zero-the tax does not contribute to utility.
Second, unlike with the usual tax, the legal rule can impose different
costs for different attributes. The cost of the mandate on each margin
can be different and even unknown to the lawmaker.
Third, unlike a tax, the "tax rate" and "benefit rate" of the ad
valorem cost imposed by a legal rule on an attribute might well depend on the level of that attribute: the cost and benefit rates are functions of attribute levels. Ad valorem taxes are not usually designed
with anything other than a flat rate structure. By contrast, the legal
rule can impose a progressive, regressive, or even negative rate structure on the attribute. In the case of a positive rate structure (even a
progressive one), the result runs in the same direction as with the posi66

See Craswell, 43 Stan L Rev at 370-71 (cited in note 1).

67

See, for example, Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, 50 Stan L Rev at 1505-08 (cited in note 3).

68

The negative rate structure is just the case, again, where the legal rule presents net bene-
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tive flat-rate structure. For the regressive rate structure, there would
only be an incentive to increase quality if the cost-lowering effect
through the regressive rate-increased value leads to lower proportionate cost-outweighed the cost-increasing effect of having more B
around to tax. An example might be an "ad valorem" warranty whose
cost could be avoided more effectively by an increase than by a decrease in quality.
Thus, the legal rule that imposes costs on an ad valorem basis
tends to lead to lower quality, as does the ad valorem tax, but, unlike
the tax, legal rules can impose benefits and can apply costs and benefits at different rates to different attributes. The situation of a legal
rule that imposes a constant ad valorem "rate" of cost on all margins
of a product is illustrated below in Figure 5.
FIGURE 5
EFFECrS OFAN AD VALOREM LEGAL RULE

swv(p)
sW(A) + S(B)
= SW(A + B)

Price per
A+B
and per
A

SW(A)
S(A+B)

S(A)
D

QW(P) QW(A + B)

Q1

The pre-mandate supply curves are S(A) for the supply of A
alone, S(P) for the supply of the package that contains both A and B,
and S(A + B) for the supply of A and B separately (the vertical sum of
S(A) and S(B)). Similarly, the corresponding post-mandate upwardlyshifted supply curves are SW(A), SW(A + B), and SW(P). The equilib-
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rium quantity after the mandate falls less with variable quality
(QW(A + B)) than expected on the rigid-quality framework (QW(P)),
because the supply curve for the (rigid) product shifts up more with
the mandate than does the curve that is the vertical sum of the supplies of the separate attributes. Correspondingly, price rises less with
variable quality than under rigid quality.
If the legal rule succeeded in defining the product completely,
then there would be no incentive to reduce quality. For example, if the
legal rule mandated that any sales of A and B for the benefit of the
same consumer would be subject to the mandate, then the result
would be no shift in quality. Not only is it costly to specify margins in
this way, enforcement of the resulting rule likely would be administratively unworkable. In the case of legal rules with costs of either the
per-unit or ad valorem type, the rigid-quality analysis would be appropriate if all margins were specified in the rule. Notice that, again, the
ad valorem legal rule imposes a different deadweight loss than the
corresponding fully specified legal rule implied by the constantquality framework. The welfare-loss triangle is smaller than under
constant quality, but there is an additional component to the loss
stemming from the effort to avoid the cost: here that extra component
is the area from 0 to QW(A + B) lying between the S(P) and S(A + B)

supply (marginal cost) curves. This extra component of loss reflects
that, in the post-mandate equilibrium, each unit will be produced at
the higher marginal cost of the separate A and B. The overall welfare
loss should be less than that imposed by the inefficient legal rule, but
the rule will also likely have less of the intended effect (assuming a
non-efficiency-related purpose). As in the case of the per-unit mandate, the ad valorem legal rule leads to ambiguous data. The extra
price fall could be mistaken for a fall in demand and thus help mask
any increase in demand stemming from the benefits of the legal mandate.9 Again, how much of a price drop reflects demand factors will
tend to be obscured by the overlay of simultaneous quality changes
induced by the legal rule in question.
III. TAX-LIKE LIABILITY RULES

In the preceding Part, I analyzed legal rules that were designed to
favor buyers in a way that the pre-mandate market equilibrium fails to
do. This Part extends the analysis to legal rules that are designed to in69 As for quantity, to the extent that it will be salient, quantity will decrease less under
variable quality in a case like that illustrated. This can be interpreted as a shift (somewhat) outward in demand. As I argue in Part I.B, it seems that price effects are more salient in this area

than are quantity effects, and so confusion resulting from quality changes induced by the costs of
a legal mandate is likely to take the form discussed in the text.
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ternalize "externalities," i.e., pricing instruments such as Pigovian
taxes and liability rules. 0 Liability rules differ from Pigovian taxes in
that the amount levied is paid as compensation to victims under the
liability rule rather than inuring to the public fisc.7' Liability rules,
which seek to charge an actor with an amount approximating the cost
of the external harm, also differ from property rules, which carry a
strong penalty aimed theoretically at completely deterring unilateral
taking of entitlements.3 Many commentators have advocated expanding the use of taxes or liability rules because of an important feature they share: Pigovian taxes and liability,rules "harness" private actors' information, leaving officials to determine who is the cheapestcost-avoider and the external costs that the individual or firm causes.
In contrast, property rules require that officials determine the costs
and benefits of a given activity themselves and set the optimal level of
that activity accordingly. Thus, liability rules only require part of the
information necessary to create a property rule. That taxes and liability rules require a proper subset of the information required to design
a property rule is what I call the "informational-subset" argument.
This informational-subset argument seems to be expanding in scope.
Recently, some commentators have. advocated liability rules over
property rules for controlling externalities such as pollution, even
where the exact level of harm is not known to officials.74
As I will show, this informational-subset argument depends on an
assumption of rigid quality, and endogenizing quality renders the informational-subset argument problematic. Endogenizing quality leads
to other interesting results here too, but ones that differ somewhat
from the case of the mandate. Pigovian taxes (and liability rules)
benefit from direct quality changes that make the cost of compliance
with the legal standard lower, and this is a substantial component of
what we expect from cheapest-cost-avoiders. But, as in the case of legal mandates, indirect quality changes may complicate the picture.75
70 See A.C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare 172-203 (Macillan 4th ed 1938). For a discussion of Pigovian taxes and references to the vast literature, see William J.Baumol and Wallace
E. Oates, The theory of environmentalpolicy 21-35,42-47 (Cambridge 2d ed 1988).
71
Pigovian taxes are also beneficial to the extent that they reduce the need for distortionary taxes elsewhere in the economy. I will focus more on the comparison of liability rules and
property rules, which have identical revenue effects of zero.
72 The article that introduced the liability rule versus property rule framework is Guido
Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules Liability Rules; and Inalienability:One View
of the Cathedral,85 Harv L Rev 1089 (1972).

73

Cheapest-cost-avoider analysis was introduced into law and economics in Calabresi, The

Costs ofAccidents at 135-73 (cited in note 46).
74 Kaplow and Shavell, 109 Harv L Rev at 717-18 (cited in note 9); Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, On the Superiority of Corrective Taxes to Quantity Regulation, National Bureau of
Economic Research Working Paper No 6251 *6-9 (1997).
75 Other arguments have been advanced in favor of liability rules; in what ways the possi-
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When the measurement of the externality is approximate, indirect
quality changes may generate extra information costs for liability rules
and in some cases can, surprisingly, make them inferior to regulation
by direct control of quantity (i.e., by property rules). 76 Indirect quality
effects may explain why pollution retains its attractiveness as the classic example for advocates of liability rules and Pigovian taxes more
generally7' I end this Part with a discussion of subsidies, for which indirect quality effects pose special problems.
A. Taxes, Externalities, and Direct Quality Effects
We have already seen that the "excess cost" of a mandate can be
viewed as an excise tax that may affect quality through transactors' efforts at minimizing the incidence of this tax-like burden. But there is a
more straightforward and seemingly well known parallel between legal rules and taxes: both Pigovian taxes and liability rules (such as
strict liability in tort) aim to charge actors with the external costs they
impose. The two types of rules differ in who receives the levied
amount: Pigovian taxes are paid to the government, whereas liability
rules usually provide compensation for the victim. Pigovian taxes are
not always an improvement; as is well known, the Coase Theorem
holds that in an ideal world (specifically one without transaction
costs), there would be no need for such taxes because costless bargaining would eliminate them.7 However, it is also true that in a zerotransaction-cost world a command-and-control economy would work
too (planners would have complete information and orders would be
costlessly given and carried out).7 9 Instead, transaction costs and government's costs (administrative, political) are both positive, and, in any
given situation, the problem is how to minimize the total cost of organizing economic activity. I will focus on the effects of quality
bility of quality changes complicate these arguments is beyond the scope of this Article. See, for
example, Ian Ayres and Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining:Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 Yale L J 1027, 1036-72 (1995) (arguing that liability rules facilitate
bargaining); Ian Ayres and Eric Talley, DistinguishingBetween Consensual and Nonconsensual
Advantages of Liability Rules, 105 Yale L J 235 (1995) (same); Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell,
Do Liability Rules FacilitateBargaining?A Reply to Ayres and Talley, 105 Yale L J 221 (1995)
(questioning the conclusions of Ayres and Talley).
76 Because in this section I take the informational-subset argument as a starting point, I am
following the convention in the literature on this argument of casting a choice between a quantity-based instrument backed up by a sanction on the one hand and pricing mechanisms on the
other as one of property rules versus liability rules. This can sometimes be misleading. See notes
99 and 119.
77 See text accompanying notes 84-88.
78 Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost,3 J L & Econ 1 (1960).
79 See Steven N.S. Cheung, The Transaction Costs Paradigm:1998 PresidentialAddress
Western Economic Association, 36 Econ Inquiry 514, 518-20 (1998) (arguing that in zerotransaction-costs world there would be no need for a market or property rights).
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changes as one piece of the overall picture that ultimately includes
considerations of political feasability. o Treating the question as one of
choosing between instruments under unitary fiat is a useful analytical
exercise to tease out the role that certain factors-here quality
changes-play, and analysis should not stop with that (although this
seems to be all too often forgotten).' Examination of wider political
concerns, despite its relevance to an analysis of a given regulation, is
beyond the scope of this Article. In the next Part, I show how indirect
variable quality leads to information costs that bear on the choice of
legal instruments for regulating economic activity.
Before turning to the indirect quality effects, it is worth emphasizing that direct quality effects often reinforce the desired outcome of
a Pigovian tax or liability rule. If a tax or a liability rule is designed to
internalize an externality, we want the supply curve of a firm to shift
upward by the cost that the activity imposes.2 The supply curve is the
firm's marginal cost of production, and the tax is meant to shift this
curve upward by the amount of the external harm remaining after
cost-effective abatement measures have been taken, thus producing a
new marginal cost curve that is the sum of the original marginal costs
plus the marginal cost of the harm. A new equilibrium will be established at the intersection of this new supply curve and the demand
curve. Consider Figure 3 in Part I.B.1 above. If the purpose of the tax
or legal rule is to internalize an externality, then the shift upward
would not be wasteful-as it was in the case of the mandate-but
rather efficiency-increasing.
Quality changes-ones that I am calling "direct"-now lead to
even greater efficiency. When Figure 3 is taken to depict a tax or rule
aimed at an externality, a quality change that allows the supply curve
to shift upward by less than it otherwise would is to be welcomed: such
a direct quality change means that producers are internalizing the externality in an even lower-cost way than if they merely adjusted the
production level. This is no great surprise: one of the merits of taxa80
On the politics of environmental law, see, for example, Thomas W. Merrill, Explaining
Market Mechanisms, 2000 U III L Rev (forthcoming) (discussing and synthesizing two models of
instrument choice in U.S. environmental regulation); Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 Yale L J 677, 735-97 (1999) (discussing global environmental regulation under different voting rules and implementation structures).
81 The tendency of economists not to go beyond the benevolent despot model has been
criticized. See, for example, James M. Buchanan, The Constitution of Economic Policy, 77 Am

Econ Rev 243,243 (1987) (arguing that economists "should look to the structure within which
political decisions are made" when proferring policy advice).
82 In the new equilibrium, the tax will be the amount that would be optimal after costeffective abatement measures have been used. On the assumptions needed to guarantee Pareto
optimality and convergence of tax rates with the optimal amount of the externality, see Baumol
and Oates, The theory of environmentalpolicy at 36-56,110-37 (cited in note 70).
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tion as opposed to command-and-control regulation is that it permits
firms flexibility in how the external harm is factored into production,
and direct quality changes can be viewed as one method by which
firms can respond to the new price of the harm.
B.

Indirect Quality Effects and the Choice of Liability Rules

When measurement is costly, however, quality changes can work
at cross purposes to such Pigovian taxes and liability rules. It is often
argued that "pricing" devices such as taxes and liability rules are superior to direct regulation and property rules because the information
required to implement the former is a subset of the information
needed for the latter: direct regulation requires officials to know and

weigh both costs and benefits, whereas pricing requires only knowledge of benefits.' Under pricing, economic actors-individuals or
firms-can set the officially determined price against their own marginal costs; these "cheapest-cost-avoiders" will perform and act on the
cost-benefit analysis. The informational-subset argument has been
particularly popular in the literature on environmental externalities,

with direct regulation of technology finding only modest support.5 For
pollution, quantity-based regulation has found some favor among
commentators," particularly among those in the Coasean or property83 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 414-15 (Aspen 5th ed 1998)
("[E]missions standards require cost-benefit analysis; pollution taxes require only benefit analysis."); Kaplow and Shavell, 109 Harv L Rev at 724-32 (cited in note 9); A. Mitchell Polinsky,
Controlling Externalities and Protecting Entitlements: Property Right, Liability Rule, and TaxSubsidy Approaches, 8 J Legal Stud 1 (1979). See also Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm versus
Regulationof Safety, 13 JLegal Stud 357,358-66 (1984).
94 Pigou originally proposed the taxation framework with pollution as a core case. Pigou,
The Economics of Welfare at 29-30, 183-203 (cited in note 70). The approach has found many
advocates. See, for example, Kaplow and Shavell, 109 Harv L Rev at 719 (cited in note 9). See
also Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 414-15 (cited in note 83); Polinsky, 8 J Legal Stud 1
(cited in note 83).
85 See, for example, Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation
of Uniform Standards and "Fine-Tuning"Regulatory Reforms, 37 Stan L Rev 1267, 1271 (1985)
(identifying "numerous advantages of uniform standards"); Thomas 0. McGarity, Radical Technology-Forcingin EnvironmentalRegulation, 27 Loyola LA L Rev 943, 944, 955 (1994) (arguing
that in some instances banning an activity and forcing the development of new technology may
be a superior method of regulation); Sidney A. Shapiro and Thomas 0. McGarity, Not So Paradoxica The Rationale for Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 Duke L J 729 (arguing that congressional regulation requiring the use of the "best available technology" is rational and compares favorably to market-related regulation).
86 See, for example, Baumol and Oates, The theory of environmentalpolicy at 57-78 (cited
in note 70) (arguing that in some instances quantity controls, such as tradable emission permits,
may work better than price controls, such as Pigovian taxes); William . Baumol and Wallace E.
Oates, The Use of Standardsand Pricesfor Protectionof the Environment,73 Swed J Econ 42,42,
51 (1971) (finding that establishing standards for environmental quality and imposing unit taxes
to achieve those standards may be more practical than levying a Pigovian tax); Martin L. Weitzman, Pricesvs. Quantities,41 Rev Econ Stud 477,477-79 (1974) (claiming that there is no universal rationale for preferring price controls over quantity controls); Gary W. Yohe, Towards a Gen-
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rule camp who propose quantity-based tradable permits.7 But even
these proposals are susceptible to the critique from the informational-

subset argument for pricing. Notably, Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell have argued that the informational argument for liability rules

holds up even when courts have only a rough notion of average damage from an externality
But this "informational-subset" argument loses its validity when
the assumption of rigid quality is dropped: variable quality may cause
the information costs associated with Pigovian taxes and liability rules
to differ and in some cases those costs may be higher for the pricing
mechanism than for regulation and property rules. The choice between the two depends in part on how large those information costs

from variable quality are. Before turning to how indirect quality
changes weaken the informational-subset argument, it is worth em-

phasizing that indirect quality effects need not always weigh against
liability rules. Instead, indirect quality effects qualify the theoretical
arguments for Pigovian taxes and liability rules and cause the data to
be more ambiguous.
1.

The informational-subset argument for liability rules.

One of the simplest and most enduring arguments for Pigovian
taxes and liability rules, especially in law and economics, has been
based on relative information costs. It is said that the information required to implement taxes and liability rules is a subset (usually
proper) of the information required to devise controls and property

eral Comparisonof Price Controls and Quantity Controls under Uncertainty, 45 Rev Econ Stud
229 (1978) (concluding that Weitzman's assertions are valid under less rigid assumptions). See
also Susan Rose-Ackerman, Effluent Charges:A Critique,6 Can J Econ 512 (1973) (criticizing
the argument for effluent charges for failing to adequately consider real-world complexities and
suggesting that non-market regulatory devices may be preferable); Michelle . white and Donald
Wittman, A Comparison of Taxes Regulation, and Liability Rules under Imperfect Information,
12 J Legal Stud 413,414-20 (1983) (comparing costs of taxes and controls in linear case in which
uncertainty introduces an additive constant).
87 In his critique of Pigovian taxes, Coase proposed that property rights could internalize
pollution externalities. Coase, 3 J L & Econ at 1-2 (cited in note 78). As a method of implementing a property approach, commentators have advocated tradable emissions permits of a
slice of an officially determined quantity of allowable pollution. See, for example, J.H. Dales,
Pollution, property & prices 93-97 (Toronto 1968) (describing possible market in pollution
rights); T.H. ietenberg, Emissions Trading:an exercise in reforming pollution policy (Resources
for the-Future 1985); Thomas D. Crocker, The Structuringof Atmospheric Pollution Control Systems, in Harold Wolozin, ed, The Economics of Air Pollution:A Symposium 61, 81-84 (Norton
1966); W. David Montgomery, Markets in Licenses and Efficient Pollution ControlPrograms,5 J
Econ Theory 395 (1972); William O'Neill, et al, Transferable Discharge Permits and Economic
Efficiency: The Fox River, 10 J Envtl Econ & Mgmt 346 (1983); Thomas H. Tietenberg, Transferable DischargePermits and the Controlof StationarySource Air Pollution:A Survey and Synthesis, 56 Land Econ 391 (1980).
88 Kaplow and Shavell, 109 Harv L Rev at 731-32 (cited in note 9).
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rules. For rules like the former that are designed to charge a fee for
external harm, we need only know the marginal-or maybe even only
the average"-harm caused by a unit of the externality-producing activity. Charging that as a tax or liability will then induce the actor (say,
a firm) to set that fee equal to its marginal costs of compliance by cutting back on the activity or abating its harmful effects. Because the
firm or other actor knows its control costs better than officials, the tax
or liability rule harnesses this information without the need for officials to develop it independently; instead, the officials have placed liability on the cheapest-cost avoider.
By contrast, property rules and controls set standards that are
backed up by hefty sanctions. To implement these, the informationalsubset argument goes, officials need to know both the level of external
harm and external benefit: officials are engaged in the cost-benefit
analysis of the activity themselves. The information they require to do
so will include the information about benefits required by taxes and
liability rules, and some besides-the information about control costs
that the taxes and liability rules "harness" from the private actors.
Thus, in situations where control costs and external harms are not correlated, ' the information needed to implement taxes or liability rules
is a proper subset of that required for control or property rules, and
the former are predicted to do at least as well as the latter and usually
better.
As is often the case, this argument makes some strong implicit assumptions about measurement costs. In situations where measurement
costs are trivial or otherwise do not impact the two types of rules differently, the informational-subset argument has some appeal. And in
the economics literature, it is often assumed that measurement costs
will not significantly differ under the two regimes. 91
But there is no guarantee that measurement costs can safely be
ignored in this way. Measurement costs can vary for a variety of reasons. In the next subpart, I concentrate on measurement costs in the
presence of indirect quality changes. For now, note that taxes and liability rules can require a more costly measurement of marginal harm
than do property rules. Under a property rule that says that one cannot engage in externality-producing activity more than x units, to impose liability one only need satisfy oneself that the level of activity is
greater than x. There will be some cases in which the level is clearly
89

90

Id at 727.

Id at 727 n 43,777.
Again, this is partly due to the tacit assumption that quality is constant. For a particularly clear example of how the tacit assumption of constant quality leads to abstracting away
from measurement costs in the pollution context, see Baumol and Oates, The theory of environmentalpolicy at 164 n 10,168-69 (cited in note 70).
91
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above x, particularly if x is zero (i.e., the rule allows none of the activity). Consider speeding: charging speeders (or even speeders who get
into accidents) with the marginal cost of each mile per hour of speed
requires more measurement than does a rule that sets a limit, say 55
miles per hour. Cars going 100 miles per hour are clear violators and
no more than eyeball measurement would be needed.
Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell have recently argued that these
costs will not favor property rules.? They claim that even using expected harm as an approximate measure would be enough to lead one
to prefer liability rules. This can be interpreted in any of three ways,
none of which takes measurement costs very seriously. Kaplow and
Shavell might be claiming that we should charge average expected
harm where we do not know with precision the exact level of harm,
but they are assuming that we have good information on exact levels
of activity (speeding in my example, pollution in their main example).
Or they may assume that this latter measurement problem-the metering problem-is not significant in absolute terms. Or they may not
see it as important in relative terms; perhaps in their view metering
costs will not differ much from liability rules to property rules.
Any of these three assumptions is questionable. The significance
and relative size of metering problems presented by liability and
property rules are simply empirical questions that no amount of a priori reasoning will decide. This becomes especially apparent when we
turn to the effects of indirect quality changes.
2. Informational effects of variable quality.
Variable quality can lead to information costs that differ from
those under rigid quality, and if quality is allowed to vary, the simple
informational-subset argument for liability rules no longer holds. Actual taxation of externalities requires that they be measured to some
degree. Individuals and firms cannot be charged with the level of harm
that they cause unless we can measure that level. If this measurement
is costly, it will not be cost-effective for officials to pursue measurement to the point of complete accuracy. In other words, there can be a
divergence between the measured level of harm and the actual level
of harm. Some scholars have argued that this does not affect the case
for Pigovian taxes and liability rules as long as there is no bias in such
errors: Pigovian taxes and liability rules are superior to direct regulation and property rules as long as our use of expected average harm is
not systematically biased upward or downward from actual harm.?

92
93

See Kaplow and ShaveU, 109 Harv L Rev at 719 (cited in note 9).
See, for example, id at 731,776-77.

2000]

Ambiguous Quality Changes

And, it is assumed, there is no reason to think that such biases pose
difficult problems.
This view rests on the unstated assumption, common in the litera-

ture, that quality is rigid. For if quality is allowed to vary, errors of
measurement take on more significance. In particular, where meas-

urement is by proxy or where measurement of all the components of a
harmful externality are not equally easy to measure, the indirect quality effects discussed above in connection with the mandated product
enhancement can work at cross-purposes to the legal rule. If quality
can vary, then an approach to externalities based on Pigovian taxes or
liability rules can be less cost-effective than one based on property
rules, because the latter may preclude indirect quality effects at lower
cost than can the tax or the liability rule.
Now consider the classic example of the legal response to pollution again. Firms produce a quantity of good (q) and in the process
cause harmful emissions or effluents. For simplicity and without loss of
generality, this pollution is made up of two attributes, A and B. These
attributes correlate with the level of environmental damage and can
range from levels of harmful chemicals to the speed of emission to the
height of a smokestack. These attributes can also be indexes that cor-

relate with harm, such as biochemical oxygen demand ("BOD") as a
measure of an emission's organic waste load." BOD is widely used as
an index of harm from effluents, but it is approximate at best: emissions that are low in BOD can nevertheless contain high levels of
harmful inorganic pollutants.9 Sometimes "pollution" is measured
using such approximate measures as BOD.9 Or activity level or output
itself can be used as a proxy for the amount of harm from emissions.9

94 See, for example, Baumol and Oates, The theory of environmentalpolicy at 170 (cited in
note 70). A higher smokestack can sometimes disperse emissions, reducing their harm, but can
also lead to acid rain. See, for example, id; Ralph Turvey, On Divergences between Social Cost and
Private Cost,30 Economica 309,312 (1963).
95 See Baumol and Oates, The theory of environmental policy at 162 & n 4 (cited in note
70).
96 Id at 162 n4.
97 In one well known example, uniform water quality standards for the Delaware River
Basin were based almost exclusively on BOD. United States Department of the Interior, Federal
Water Pollution Control Administration, Delaware Estuary Comprehensive Study: Preliminary
Report and Findings (1966). See also Latin, 37 Stan L Rev at 1275-76 & n 33 (cited in note 85).
The study and the resulting command-and-control regulations were criticized for excessively focusing on BOD and largely ignoring other types of pollution. Bruce A. Ackerman, et al, The UncertainSearchfor Environmental Quality 28-29,137-38,209-10 (Free Press 1974).
98 For example, in the regulation of volatile organic compounds, emissions are "measured"
by multiplying reported activity by emission factors instead of monitoring actual emissions. This
can lead to substitution towards paints and solvents with actual emission rates higher than those
on which the calculated emissions factors are based. Dale B. Thompson, PoliticalObstacles to the
Implementation of Emissions Markets: Lessons from RECLAIM, 40 Nat Resources J (forthcoming 2000).
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It is such approximate measures that can lead to undesirable quality
changes in response to pricing-style regulation.
Consider a hypothetical case in which the regulatory authority
can accurately measure A, but B is difficult to measure. At current,
pre-regulation production levels and methods, attribute A is a chemical component or index that correlates with harm, and the amount of
B emitted by competitive firms causes minimal damage. If an effluent
charge is imposed on A, the component that is currently harmful but
easy to measure, then firms with different control costs will react differently. Now suppose that firms with high-control costs could use an
alternative technology that emits more B relative to A. This is much
like the case of the per-unit tax discussed above: units of the externality are defined in terms of A, and a per-unit charge, whether by tax or
liability rules, is imposed on these units. Under variable quality, we
should expect a trend towards more B relative to A: the tax on A
makes the use of B relatively cheaper. Firms will cut output and increase B: this is an increase in "quality" from the firm's point of view,
but from society's point of view this is a decrease in (environmental)
quality. Specifically, the increased use of B presents officials with an
uninternalized externality or, alternatively, with more measurement
costs. By hypothesis, attribute B is costly to measure, and thus in this
situation a rule will lead to greater costs the more it causes firms to increase B.
Now either taxing A or limiting its quantity could lead to substitution in the direction of relatively more of attribute B. The measurement costs posed by such adjustments could take on different sizes for
the two types of rules because A and B are not equally costly to
measure: this alone conflicts with the simple informational-subset argument.
Moreover, the problems of indirect quality adjustments may differ depending on the level of A used. If so, then a quantity-based instrument like some property rules can be used to constrain A to a
level at which indirect quality adjustments towards hard-to-measure B
are kept down." A particularly important case is the one in which the
use of B is subject to scale economies: only a firm that uses high
amounts of A will find it worthwhile to substitute toward B when A is
taxed or constrained. This will not always be true, but, again, even the
possibility of differential ease of substitution at different production
99

Broadly speaking, quantity-based regulation could take the form of command-and-

control, quantity ceilings, or tradable permits. With tradable permits, problems of indirect quality
changes similar to those arising under pricing instruments in the scenario in the text might require additional quantity limits on individual firms or on certain trades. In other words, the more
that indirect quality changes are important, the more the firm-level quantity-limiting aspect of
quantity-based instruments can become attractive.
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levels is enough to show that the simple informational-subset argument does not hold under variable quality. And to the extent that the
cost of determining ranges where substitution occurs less easily is
small relative to other information costs, like actually measuring B itself, the case for quantity-based instruments over pricing instruments
is strengthened. In such cases, the welfare loss from the liability rule
can be greater, as illustrated in Figure 6.
FIGURE 6
PROPERTY RULE VERSUS TAX OR LIAIILITY RULE
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In this figure, the S curves are firms' marginal costs of production
(supply curves), and the CC curves are marginal pollution-control cost
curves. The CC curves can be thought of as denoting marginal benefits
from polluting because firms control pollution by foregoing those
benefits. CCH is for firms with high marginal control costs (high marginal benefit) and CCL corresponds to firms with lower levels of such
costs. The discussion will focus on the firms with high control costs, for
whom the regulations are the most binding, but it should be kept in
mind that regulators will often have very imperfect information about
where firms' control cost curve actually lie. This uncertainty will figure
in the analysis to follow.
As is usual, it is assumed that, as quantity produced increases,
marginal costs and harms increase (rising S curves) and marginal con-
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trol costs (benefits) decrease. SA represents the marginal harm from
production using the production method that results in A-type pollution, and S,, denotes the marginal harm from the production method
with a substantial component of B. In the unregulated equilibrium, the
former A-type production will be chosen over the AB-type because it
costs less (SA lies below S,, at all points). For firms with high marginal
control costs, this pre-regulatory equilibrium is characterized by
amount Q, where SA and CCH meet. Now if a Pigovian tax (or liability
rule) is imposed on A, which is not costly to measure and which presents the current problem, SA will shift upward to S(TA)A. But because

the price on the externality is imposed on a per-unit basis on A, the
supply curve for SAB under the tax (or liability rule) does not shift up
as far, only to S(TA)AB. Firms will now chose the AB-type production
method. This will impose a deadweight loss (not counting revenue effects) of the black triangle and the other black-shaded area, the latter
representing the waste from using the more costly production method
for all units up to Qr By comparison, quantity control will be characterized by some error; here it achieves quantity Q, ("quantity under
property rule") which falls short of the optimum Q*. But, in this example, the error cost from the property rule, represented by the gray
triangle is less than the loss from the pricing instrument (Pigovian tax,
liability rule) because it avoids the substitution possibilities within the
"activity" of polluting.
One solution to the problems of the Pigovian tax or liability rule
would be to institute a tax on B as well. This would raise the SA, curve
not just to S(TA)A, but to S(TA)AB. Now firms will choose the A-type

production and because of the tax on A, they will produce the optimum, Q*. But, by hypothesis, measuring B is more costly than measuring A. The question is whether it is cost-effective to incur1 measurement costs in order to move the S(TA) towards S(TAB)A. " There is
no a priori reason for this to be so. In other words, with endogenous
quality, property rules and quantity regulation can be more efficient
than Pigovian taxes or liability rules.01 Specifically, the informational100 This could take several forms, all of which are potentially costly. Definition of the "activity" can be refined to include level of B or the type of production process. Or punitive damages could be used to adjust for a low probability of detection, but this requires measurement of
the probability of detection. Nor is the awareness that B is a problem sufficient to guarantee a
low-cost measurement of its full extent: one can be fairly certain that substitution from B causes
problems greater than the error costs (including estimation costs) under the quantity instrument
without being able to come up with an unbiased estimate of the damage from B. That is, the
"first" units of damage may be easier to perceive than "later" ones, leaving the tail of a problem

of a size that is costly to measure.
101 Note that instituting a Pigovian tax or liability rule with an eye to achieving a certain

quantity level makes such devices into quantity-based instruments. Conversely, what appears to
be a quantity-based instrument can really be' a pricing instrument if the level of quantity allowed
is set based on the price that permits fetch in the market.
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subset argument does not go through in its simple form if quality is
allowed to vary.
This caveat holds particularly true with liability rules based, as
Kaplow and Shavell advocate, on average expected harm. ' 2 The reason for choosing average expected harm is the difficulty of measuring
harm to victims in particular cases. '°3 But it is in precisely these circumstances that we need to be worried about the quality of activities
shifting. Substitution among rigidly defined activities is not the only
problem: hard-to-measure substitution within activities can cause liability rules, particularly those based on average expected harm, to
become unattractive. Put differently, the possibility of indirect quality
changes makes less plausible Kaplow and Shavell's crucial assumption
that courts' estimates of average expected harm need not be downwardly biased "° The analysis suggests that in some cases, inaccuracy in
the standard for quantity regulation that misses the optimal quantity
is worth incurring if it allows one to avoid the measurement costs or
externalities presented by increased use of B.
The problem identified here with liability rules bears some resemblance to scenarios examined in both the property rights and
agency theory literatures. As a matter of property rights, two parties
contracting over an asset will leave some margins unpriced because
delineating and enforcing property rights to them is not worth the
cost, and the unpriced margins will lead to efforts by those with access
to the asset to try to capture the value of these undefended attributes.'°, Thus, in a contract between a landowner and a farmer, the
farmer will have an incentive to shirk under a wage contract, and the
landowner will have an incentive to underprovide improvements to
the land under a rental contract. In addition, under the rental contract
(especially for a short term), the farmer may have an incentive to
overuse soil nutrients. The choice of contract will reflect a trade-off
among the losses from these incentives to capture unprotected wealth.
In addition, the nature of the contract can serve partially to protect
against opportunism even where such behavior cannot be observed

102 Kaplow and Shavell, 109 Harv L Rev at 731 (cited in note 9).
103 Other objections to using average as opposed to marginal harm have been identified.
See, for example, Colin Read, The MarginalAgent and JudicialIntervention in the Marketplace,
30 Con L Rev 647, 663-64 (1998) (concluding that average harm rule will deter some efficient
retakings by original entitlement holders); Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of The Cathedral, 106
Yale L J 2175, 2193-97 (1997) (analyzing liability under average harm rule as a common-pool

problem in some circumstances).
104 Kaplow and Shavell, 109 Harv L Rev at 730-31,776-77 (cited in note 9). More precisely,
there will be situations in which the downward bias is sufficiently large and costly enough to remove (by measuring B) that the property rule will be more efficient.
105 See, for example, Yoram Barzel, Economic Analysis of Property Rights 44-48 (Cambridge 2d ed 1997).
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directly. In the land contract, the landowner could restrict the supply
of water, which is a complement of soil nutrients in such a way as to
make overuse of the nutrients less attractive.' More generally, the
furnishing of substitutes or the restricting of complements to an attribute that is costly to measure can be the most cost-effective method
of stemming losses along those margins. ' wTo anticipate somewhat, liability rules and Pigovian pricing schemes can be analogized to the
rental payment-a negative payment-in the landowner-farmer contract. Liability rules will need to be supplemented or supplanted when
measurement problems become relatively large along other margins.
The issue of the relative ease of measurement along various margins has recently been analyzed more formally in the agency theory
literature. Agency theory originally centered on an agent who was to
perform one task, but it has now expanded to consider the much more
interesting (and realistic) situation in which the agent faces multiple
tasks that compete for her effort (or a multi-dimensional task whose
dimensions present competing demands for effort). ' In multi-task
agencies.the relative ease of measurement can put a limit on the use
of incentives. Examples include teachers who are expected to teach
facts and (harder-to-measure) analytical techniques. °' Incentives
based on test scores that reflect the former can cause a substitution
away from effort at the latter, hard-to-measure margin, leading to
suboptimal effort. Other examples include workers who must both
produce volume and good quality or who must produce output and
care for the machines they use to produce it. Wages tied to volume of
output can lead to suboptimal effort on other margins that are costlier
to measure, such as quality of output or care for the machine. 0 In such
situations, incentives cannot be tied too directly to the easy-tomeasure component of output, or the structure of tasks and asset
ownership might be altered,' or increased measurement in some form
112
must be undertaken.
106 Id.
107 Id at 48. See also Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the

Open Fields,29 J Legal Stud 131,161-67 (2000) (analyzing boundaries as prices or sanctions).
108See, for example, Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom, Multitask Principal-AgentAnalyses: Incentive ContractS Asset Ownership,and Job Design, 7 J L, Econ, & Org 24 (Special Issue
1991) (claiming that a model incorporating multiple tasks or multi-dimensional tasks of the
agent can explain numerous features of the principal-agent relationship); Bernard SinclairDesgagn6, How to Restore Higher-PoweredIncentives in MultitaskAgencies, 15 J L, Econ, & Org

418 (1999) (discussing compensation of agents with multiple, difficult-to-measure tasks).
109 Holmstrom and Milgrom, 7 J L, Econ, & Org at 25 (cited in note 108).
110 Id.

111 The hard-to-measure task might be assigned to another agent, especially one with a residual claim on output.
112 Hoimstrom and Milgrom, 7 J L, Econ, & Org at 50-51 (cited in note 108). SinclairDesgagn6 interestingly suggests that under certain circumstances higher-powered incentives can
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Some of the measurement issues involved in a pricing scheme can
be illustrated by the results of a study by Don
S• 113Fullerton and Thomas
C. Kinnaman on residential garbage pricing. Several communities
have instituted a price per bag for pick up of garbage from residences.
The aim of the program is not just to raise revenue, but also to internalize the costs of garbage to the homeowners. This led to the "Seattle
Stomp," so-called after the response to Seattle's early unit-pricing
program, whereby homeowners would expend great effort compacting
their own garbage in order to reduce the incidence of the per-bag fee.
This effort is a social waste because garbage will be compacted by
collectors anyway. By studying data on garbage from individual
households in Charlottesville, Virginia, a town that adopted a per-unit
fee in 1992, the authors were able to establish that in response households reduced the volume of garbage (by stomping) but did not necessarily reduce much the weight of garbage. Indirect evidence
pointed to
14
'
a small increase in recycling and some illegal dumping.
From our point of view, measurement costs can explain many features of garbage pricing. First, and most clearly, pricing garbage on a
per-unit of volume basis increased the "quality" (weight) of each garbage bag, but at a social cost. Thus, volume is an A (specified) attribute, and weight is a B (unspecified) attribute, and pricing A means
more of attribute B. Crucially, although Fullerton and Kinnaman's
study is not concerned with measurement-cost explanations, B here is
difficult to measure relative to A: weighing each household's garbage
would give a much better index of costs that ideally would be internalized, but weighing is much more costly than counting bags. Moreover, social costs include the locks that commercial dumpsters need to
be fitted with in order to prevent use by residents and the costs of
cleaning up garbage dumped in wooded areas, 5 but these can be regarded as part of the measurement and enforcement costs along other
margins when units of volume are priced."' If garbage volume is
be restored in multi-task agencies by linking the auditing of the hard-to-measure task with success in the easy-to-measure task; this converts effort on the tasks from being substitutes to being
complements. Sinclair-Desgagnd, 15 J L, Econ, & Org at 418,424-26 (cited in note 108). As Sin-

clair-Desgagnd himself notes, this method is meant for purposes of internal monitoring and the
audits it requires are not costless. Id at 430-31. For our purposes, it is sufficient to note that the
measurement costs attributable to the use of liability rules would be those characteristic of the
least-cost monitoring system. In some cases, the least-cost monitoring system might involve

audits, but whether this would render liability rules more cost-effective than quantity-based rules
or other alternative methods for constraining actors remains an empirical question, as argued in
the text.
113Don Fullerton and Thomas C. Kinnaman, Household Responses to Pricing Garbageby
the Bag,86 Am Econ Rev 971 (1996).
114 Id at 978-80.
115Id at 978-80,982.
116 The authors estimated that the programs were not cost-effective given the easily meas-
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priced, these margins will require increased monitoring, the costs must
be endured, or measures that depart from Pigovian taxes must be
used. ' 7 Even the seeming triviality and obviousness (ex post) of these
problems reinforces the theme of this Article. If such clear quality and
measurement problems as stomping and illegal dumping were overlooked in traditional Pigovian analysis of this problem-as they
were -then more complex examples like consumer product warranties, air pollution, and other areas are all the more likely to result in
misdiagnosis because of quality effects.
More generally, behavior along a margin that is difficult to measure can be influenced by restricting access to goods that are complements of that margin or by facilitating access to goods that are substitutes of that margin. Generalizing on our pollution example, the increased incentive to engage in B-type pollution that results from
pricing A-the undesirable indirect quality change-might be addressed in several different ways. If B can be monitored cheaply, then
it could be priced. If B is costly enough to measure, restrictions on a
complement C, which is easier to measure, or subsidies for substitute
D, which causes less harm, could be used to address B-type pollution.
In our hypothetical, the scale of output can be thought of as a complement to B; by restricting scale through a quantity-based instrument, B can be brought under control. In this special case, the quantity
of component A might be regarded as the complement to the hard-tomeasure B. Limiting the quantity of A is the cost-effective method of
preventing B-type pollution.
Liability rules can be thought of as a negative "wage" for engaging in a certain activity. Where the overall activity of the actor has
multiple dimensions that are not all equally easy to measure, then
quality becomes a factor in the choice of regulatory instrqment. The
use of a pure pricing scheme on a dimension can lead to increased activity along other margins that are difficult to measure. In our hypothetical, charging for A-type harm can lead to a use of B that did not
make sense before. Now officials have a classic monitoring trade-off:
ured administrative costs, and admitted that they "[could not] begin to estimate" some of the
other costs such as those from increased illegal dumping. Id at 982.
117 For example, some communities have even tried a one-bag-per-week minimum, which
Fullerton and Kinnaman assume will reduce illegal dumping by one bag for those already
dumping. Id at 980-81. However, the one-bag minimum may act somewhat like a quantity ceiling
in our pollution hypothetical; by not marginally pricing the first bag, economies of scale in
dumping may be lost, thus reducing substitution to hard-to-measure margins like dumping. This
benefit must be weighed against the reduced incentive to reduce garbage below one bag per
week.
118 Fullerton and Kinnaman point out that Repetto et al's previous study of garbage pricing
ignored illegal dumping. Id at 981, citing Robert Repetto, et al, Green Fees:How a Tax Shift Can
Work for the Environment and the Economy (World Resources Inst 1992).
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the cost of the harm from B can be reduced but only by increased
monitoring effort. However, this choice only arises if officials price A.
Overall, pricing A must be compared with other methods of constraining the actor's behavior. Continuing the principal-agent analysis,
the agent's actions can be influenced by placing incentives on a given
activity or by placing or removing constraints on alternative activities.
In the public context of liability, activities can be priced or their alternatives can be addressed through sanction-like constraints. In our hypothetical, quantity regulation serves this latter function. The general
issue is whether the information costs (including expected error costs)
from using quantity-based constraints are larger or smaller than the
extra monitoring costs that arise from the indirect quality effect of the
liability rules. 19
The point about the informational requirements of liability rules
is one of second-best theory in its broadest sense. At its most general, the theory of the second best holds that internalizing any one
given externality need not be overall efficiency-increasing if other distortions remain, because the distortion eliminated may have been
counteracting another distortion. When quality is allowed to vary, such
second-best considerations can arise for reasons of measurement cost.
Internalizing an externality along one dimension can cause measurement costs to rise along other dimensions, even those that are not apparent in the pre-regulatory environment (as was B-type pollution in
our hypothetical). When this measurement cost is taken into account,
there is no a priori reason to suppose that internalizing the cost of an
easy-to-measure component of an activity will lead to greater overall
efficiency.
This analysis also suggests the desirability of hybrid systems over
pure pricing or pure control measures in some cases. A system of
Pigovian taxes, liability rules, or even tradable emissions permits could
be combined with quantity-based ceilings.' 2' Ceilings would be advis119 There will be times when seemingly obvious measures of quantity will lead to large
measurement costs as well. For example, limiting a catch of fish based on weight, even under
tradable permits, can lead to fishers discarding smaller fish at sea already dead and retaining only
the proportionately higher-priced large fish which are then measured under the quota at dockside. See Carol M. Rose, The Several Futuresof Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales; Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 Minn L Rev 129, 170-71 (1998) (discussing this and similar examples in hunting and water pollution).
120 The theory of the second best was first put forward in Richard G. Lipsey and Kelvin
Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 Rev Econ Stud 11 (1956-57). See also Richard
S. Markovits, Monopoly and the Allocative Inefficiency of First-Best-Allocatively-Efficient Tort
Law in Our Worse-Than-Second-Best World: The Whys and Some Therefores, 46 Case W Res L
Rev 313 (1996) (applying the theory of the second best to tort doctrines).
121Other hybrids of pricing and quantity-based restrictions have been proposed in order to
deal with error in pricing in short-term emergencies, see, for example, Alan J. Krupnik, Wallace
E. Oates, and Eric Van De Verg, On Marketable Air Pollution Permits: The Case for a System of
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able where we suspect that quality changes in the upper ranges of
pollution output would lead to large measurement costs-actually undertaken or in the form of uninternalized B-type pollution-under
price-based approaches. The ceiling could eliminate much of the need
to worry about the very elastic users who would engage in harmful indirect quality changes in order to reduce the incidence of the pricing.
Considering variable quality suggests some (very partial) explanations for the popularity of pricing mechanisms among some commentators and the suspicion toward them amongst regulators. Pollution is used as the paradigm case for Pigovian taxes and even for liability rules in part because we feel that pollution is easier to measure
than some other activities. This intuition is not contradicted by the
failure of liability-based pollution control programs because of the
scarcity of actually implemented non-quantity-based pollution pricing
schemes.2 Polluters are likely to know far more about the opportunities to substitute away from taxed attributes in the direction
' 2 of other
possibly quite harmful attributes that are costly to measure.
The analysis based on variable quality does not imply that quantity regulation will always or even often be superior to Pigovian taxes
or liability rules. All it suggests is that the question cannot be decided
by a priori reasoning as in the informational-subset argument. And
the analysis suggests that as actors become more "elastic" in their activities, we have to start worrying about the measurement costs in
dealing with the relevant substitutes.

Pollution Offsets, 10 J Envir Econ & Mgmt 233 (1980) (arguing for a system of tradable emissions permits subject to a restraint of no air quality violation at any receptor points), or to limit
consequences of error under uncertainty in estimating quantities, see, for example, Robert A.
Collinge and Wallace E. Oates, Efficiency in pollution control in the short and long runs: a system
of rental emission permits, 15 Can J Econ 346, 352-53 (1982); Marc J.Roberts and Michael
Spence, Effluent Charges and Licenses Under Uncertainty,5 J Pub Econ 193 (1976).
122 Limited programs involving tradable permits have been tried, but these are quantitybased programs, not Pigovian taxes: the regulator decides beforehand how many such permits to
create and then lets a market price emerge. See, for example, Daniel J. Dudek, Richard B. Stewart, and Jonathan B. Wiener, EnvironmentalPolicyfor Eastern Europe: Technology-Based Versus
Market-Based Approaches, 17 Colum J Envir L 1,18-45 (1992) (discussing tradable permit programs for plant and utility emissions, leaded gasoline, water pollution, development rights, and
fishing); Robert W. Hahn and Gordon L. Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons for Theory and
Practice,16 Ecol L Q 361, 366-96 (1989) (analyzing marketable permit programs in emissions,
leaded gasoline, and water pollution).
123 Indeed, this analysis may suggest a reason-in addition to those identified in the political economy literature-why regulators are so suspicious of Pigovian taxes: Regulators, rightly or
wrongly, might suspect that their lack of knowledge puts them at a disadvantage, and variable
quality can play a part in creating that situation. Effluent charges are used in Germany, but unlike Pigovian taxes they are based on an assessment of the expected performance of best practicable technology. See, for example, Gardner M. Brown, Jr., and Ralph W. Johnson, Pollution
Control by Effluent Charges:It Works in the FederalRepublic of Germany, Why Not in the US.,
24 Nat Resources J 929,933-49 (1984).
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C. Subsidies
Subsidies are often thought of as negative taxes, but subsidies
have their own effects, which variable quality can exacerbate. To
achieve a given policy objective, mandates and subsidies are treated as
the main alternatives to government provision. Subsidies can be given
to consumers or to producer . Traditionally analysis has focused on
several similarities and differences. Under conventional analysis, the
main allocative problems with subsidies are that they encourage entry
and discourage exit and that the taxes to fund them cause deadweight
losses. Variable quality reinforces this conclusion: even firms whose
entry or exit decisions are not affected by the subsidy will have an incentive to alter quality to increase the incidence of the subsidy. The
losses from these quality shifts are expected to be even greater than
those in the case of taxes and mandates.
1. Subsidies under rigid quality.
At first glance, under rigid quality, subsidies and mandates look
deceptively close to being mirror images of each other, particularly on
the consumer side. A mandate can be thought of as the equivalent of a
subsidy financed through a tax in the amount of the difference between the cost of the provision and the buyer's valuation. Thd tax here
is like a benefits tax in that it is tied to the amount of the benefit received. This is to be contrasted with a benefit financed out of general
revenue. On the subsidy side, the type of subsidy that comes closest to
being a mirror image of mandates is one that is earmarked for a given
type of purchase, unlike a more general subsidy like welfare payments
or a refundable credit under a negative income tax. Under rigid quality a subsidy is just a negative tax, and the subsidies that are, targeted
to certain commodities or services would closely correspond to the
tax-like aspect of legal rules that consumers value at less than cost.
When it comes to taxes and non cost-justified legal rules, rigid
quality will cause the distinction between per-unit and ad valorem cost
structures to disappear. If quality cannot change, the same "commodity" is preserved through all stages of analysis and all we need inquire
into is the elasticities of supply and demand. Likewise, when subsidies
are provided but quality is not allowed to vary (by assumption, or, in
the rare case, perhaps in fact), it would not matter whether a subsidy
provides benefits on a per-unit or an ad valorem basis.' 4 Thus, a subsidy of 50 cents per meal that happens to cost $5 would be the
equivalent of a 10 percent subsidy on meals. The subsidy is just like
the tax, the transportation charge, or the "excess" cost of the legal
124

Barzel, 84 J Pol Econ at 1185,1190-93 (cited in note 6).
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mandate (a warranty, for example), only the sign has been reversed; a
subsidy is a negative tax.
Now consider subsidies that are designed to remove an external-

ity. For example, firms could be given an amount of money for reducing pollution. The problem with such subsidies is that they are usually
worse than Pigovian taxes."' The subsidy can encourage excessive entry by firms and discourage exit, because to qualify for the subsidy one
has to be a polluter.'2 It turns out that in a competitive setting, a sub-

sidy will reduce individual firms' emissions, but can be expected to increase overall emissions by the industry because now there will be
more polluters.ln In principle, this distortion could be removed by decoupling eligibility for the subsidy from the entry-exit decision: one
could theoretically give a subsidy to both actual and potential pollut-

ers. But such efforts would lead to unacceptable levels of administrative and political costs.m

2. Subsidies under variable quality.
If however, quality is allowed to vary, the similarity between subsidies and taxes breaks down even further. We might expect that, as in

the case of taxes, variable quality causes per-unit and ad valorem subsides to diverge. This is partially correct. As Barzel has also shown,
under variable quality, taxes and subsides are not just mirror images of
each other; a subsidy behaves differently and leads to more distortion
than the corresponding tax.

129

Consider a constant per-unit subsidy on a commodity. If the demand and supply curves are linear and the subsidy rate equals the rate
of the tax, the adjustment and the corresponding welfare-loss triangle
are larger in the case of the subsidy. The quality change reinforces the

125 Baumol and Oates, The theory of environmental policy at 211-34 (cited in note 70). See
also Wiener, 108 Yale L J at 726-27 (cited in note 80).
126 Baumol and Oates, The theory of environmental policy at 212-13,215-33 (cited in note
70); David F. Bramhall and Edwin S. Mills, A Note on the Asymmetry between Fees and Payments,
2 Water Resources Res 615,615 (1966).
127 Baumol and Oates, The theory of environmental policy at 234 (cited in note 70); Wallace
E. Oates, Economics Economists, and Environmental Policy, 16 E Econ J 289,290 (1990). If the
subsidy causes a change in technology, overall emissions may be reduced, but the subsidy can still
be shown to be inferior to a Pigovian tax alternative. Wiener, 108 Yale L J at 727 n 187 (cited in
note 80); Robert E. Kohn, When Subsidies for Pollution Abatement Increase Total Emissions, 59 S
Econ J 77,84-85 (1992). See also Stuart Mestelman, Production Externalities and Corrective Subsidies:A General Equilibrium Analysis, 9 Envir Econ & Mgmt 186,191 (1982).
128 Baumol and Oates, The theory of environmental policy at 216-17 (cited in note 70). It
would be enormously costly for officials to determine which firms really are in the marginal position with respect to entry or exit. Firms would have an incentive to use resources to convince officials or politicians that they will pollute unless given a subsidy.
129 Barzel, 84 J Pol Econ at 1190-93 (cited in note 6).
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effect of the subsidy. Barzel compares a per-unit tax on light bulbsthe situation in Figure 3-to the per-unit subsidy depicted in Figure
7.
FIGURE 7
PER-UNIT SUBSIDY

Price

S(1)

service

S(2)

per unit

ss(2)

P(2)

PS(2)

----------------

SS(1)

PS(1)
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QS(2) QS(1)
Quantity of service units

In Figure 7, S(1) denotes the marginal cost (supply) of less durable light bulbs on a per unit of service basis, and S(2) the supply of
more durable light bulbs. Before the subsidy, higher durability is
cheaper per unit of lighting service than is lower durability (S(2) is
less than S(1)), which results in an equilibrium with high durability at
price P(2) and quantity Q(2). With the subsidy, the supply curve for
lesser durability shifts downward more than does the supply of higher
durability. Under the subsidy, marginal cost of lesser durability (SS(1))
is lower than the marginal cost of higher durability (SS(2)). Correspondingly, the equilibrium under the subsidy will be for low durability at price PS(2) and quantity QS(2). This new price is lower and the
quantity is higher than if quality had been constrained to the original
higher durability, which would have resulted in QS(1) and PS(1). As
before, the light-shaded area is the deadweight loss triangle, and the
dark-shaded area is the greater production costs incurred on each unit
in order to achieve the extra subsidy per unit of lighting service.

130

Id at 1191.
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Here the subsidy causes a quality shift against durability: light
services are cheaper per service unit with the subsidy if the durability
is shorter (in the example, one month rather than two'months). Suppose now that two-month bulbs are cheaper to make than one-month
bulbs; with no subsidy (or tax) one-month light bulbs cost $1 and twomonth bulbs cost $1.75. Two-month bulbs will be chosen, because
lighting services are cheaper per month that way ($0.87 ($1.75/2) versus $1 per month). Now if a per-unit subsidy of $0.75 is provided per
bulb, the one-month variety costs $0.25 and the two-month variety
costs $1. In that case, monthly lighting services cost $0.25 ($1 - $0.75)
with a one-month bulb and cost $0.50 (($1.75 - $0.75)/2) with a two-

month bulb, and so the one-month bulb will be chosen; the subsidy has
caused a shift against durability in order to maximize the subsidy per
unit of lighting services.
What is most interesting is that if quality is not allowed to vary
the welfare triangles under the tax (Figure 3) or the subsidy (Figure 7)
are equal, but if quality can vary, the subsidy leads to a larger welfareloss triangle. The subsidy causes the welfare-loss triangle to extend all
the way to QS(l) rather than only to QS(2). In both cases, the tax or
the subsidy causes a movement down along the demand curve. Quantity is therefore greater than in the case of rigid quality. This would
mitigate the effect of a tax (which causes "too little" of the commodity
to be purchased), but it exacerbates the effect of the subsidy: the subsidy will cause the "too much" to become even greater.
Now consider the implications of this analysis for consumer subsidies. Again, we might be using a subsidy to correct an externality. In
the case of the Pigovian tax, quality effects reinforced the benefits of
the tax except where measurement was approximate enough to allow
indirect quality changes that did not reduce the externality. The subsidy can suffer similar problems: where we decide to subsidize a commodity but consumers value attributes that are not part of the definition of the commodity, we can expect indirect quality changes that
may not accord with the subsidy's purpose. If light bulbs presented a
positive externality (say reduced crime) and we wanted to subsidize
them for that reason, a subsidy per light bulb would cause more
deadweight loss than a subsidy based on "light-bulb services" would.
But that is just another way of stating that we could eliminate the
problem of indirect quality effects by better definition. This is only realistic where measurement costs allow better definition at less cost
than the distortions thereby removed. In practice this will be difficult:
even in the case of such a simple commodity as a light bulb, consumers
may value not only light output and durability, but size, shape, number
(for decorative arrays of lights), etc. Measurement costs, not definitions per se, present the challenge.
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An ad valorem subsidy would present further problems. One
problem would be the open-ended nature of the subsidy and the
worry that transactors are inflating the price.' Also, here there would
be an incentive to increase quality (the opposite quality change from
the decrease expected under an ad valorem tax). But now we have the
additional problem that transactors will have an incentive to increase
levels of attributes that may not have even been present in the product in the pre-subsidy equilibrium. Thus, even if measurement and
tracking of all the pre-subsidy equilibrium attributes were costeffective, this effort might not suffice. The possibility of new attributes
being added will raise the measurement costs involved in ad valorem
subsidies, and make them that much less attractive.
Similar problems arise on the producer side when considering
subsidies versus Pigovian taxes and liability rules to correct externalities. Under conventional analysis, it is thought that for firms that
would engage in the same types of activities under either taxes or subsidies, taxes and subsidies will have the same allocative effect on their
decisionsY2 But if we allow quality to vary, firms' output can be affected by a subsidy differently from the tax, even if the firm is not on
the margin with respect to the entry-exit issue. The subsidy can lead to
additional distortion from decisions made about the levels of attributes within a type of activity, not just whether the activity is undertaken at all.' 33
D. Substitutions and Measurement Costs
At this point one could claim that the problem with conventional
analysis is that it needs a more fine-grained notion of "activity.'"' We
could decompose an activity like producing shoes into many activities
including using certain chemicals, locating in a certain place, etc. This
misses a more important point: that measurement costs are likely to
be greater when the levels of attributes within what is conventionally
thought of as an "activity" are changed. One of the reasons we see
some things as "activities" for purposes of conventional analysis and
not others is that they are easier to measure. It is easier to measure the
number of shoes produced than the levels of all the subactivities in131That is, the subsidy would be particularly problematic if it were a percentage of the sales
prices, which could be manipulated. The net flow of money might be more difficult to monitor
than the flow of goods.

Baumol and Oates, The theory of environmentalpolicy at 215 (cited in note 70).
133 That is, just as a subsidy potentially affects the entry-exit issue more than does a tax, so
132

too a subsidy can have an extra effect on the entry or exit of an attribute.
134 This would be a bit like the use of more fine-grained commodities or market analysis in
consumer theory. As mentioned earlier, this often does not take into account that measurement
costs are not the same for all such "commodities." See note 5 and accompanying text. It is meas-

urement costs, not the level of definition for analysis, that are crucial.
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volved in making them. What a framework based on variable quality
suggests is that there is no a priori reason to exclude from analysis the
response in terms of constituent subactivities. Unless ease of measurement correlates very well with likelihood of occurring (for which
there is no guarantee), then quality changes can be important to policy
analysis.
IV. AMBIGUITIES FROM ENDOGENOUS QUALITY

Before turning to some applications of the analysis of variable
quality, it is worth pointing out some previously unrecognized ambiguities that can result from variable quality in the case of "per-unit"
legal rules that do not arise from excise taxes. In special cases where
the attributes in question and the mandated warranty do not interact,
the effects of legal rules on endogenous quality are exactly the same
as those of per-unit excise taxes. Since this model is an extension of
the excise tax model, this is to be expected. However, I argue that legal rules are more complicated than taxes in several respects. First, not
only can the mandated attributes (on the model here) contribute
something to the value that consumers place on the product, the levels
of other attributes can also affect the cost or benefit of the mandated
attribute. Thus, quality increases and decreases are possible, and the
range of possibilities for legal rules is even greater than that for excise
taxes. I show that these quality shifts can lead to data from inefficient
mandates and legal rules that are similar to data reflecting efficient legal rules.
A. Ambiguities in Per-Unit Mandates
The case of quality increases due to the imposition of a non-costjustified warranty is particularly interesting, because the results can
appear much like those of a valued warranty. I will show that quality
changes can cause observational equivalence between two radically
different situations. For example, a price rise and a quantity drop can
reflect a mandate that is valued by consumers but not as much as it
costs, or the price rise and drop in "units" as defined by the legal rule
may reflect a quality increase that partially evades the cost of a legal
rule that is valued less (or not at all) by consumers. (Later we will consider cases in which cost-evading quality changes can cause price to
rise by more than the cost of a legal rule, thus partially mimicking the
situation in which the market failed to provide an efficiently mandated feature.)
As we will see, excessive focus on changes in price (or sometimes
quantity) in the wake of a legal mandate is perilous. A price rise (or a
less-than-expected price fall) can stem from either a warranty that is
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valued (or valued somewhat) or it can stem from a shift to higher
quality. Such a shift to higher quality can happen even if the warranty
is not valued by the consumers, and indeed such shifts can occur even
where the mandate is not valued as part of the product at all. In this
latter, "limiting" case, the mandate does behave like an excise tax but
nevertheless leads to price being higher than expected on the conventional constant-quality tax analogy.
Some of the difficulties stemming from variable quality can be
illustrated graphically. Ambiguity in price and quantity can simultaneously arise in the case of an induced shift in quality, if we extend the
analysis of the light bulb case. Consider a legal mandate that imposes
costs on a per-unit basis characterized by the supply and demand
curves in Figure 8.
FIGURE 8
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Both price and "quantity" are given here on a per-unit-of-service
basis. But "quantity" as specified in the legal rule and for the purpose
of data collection is measured on a per-unit-of-product basis, requiring
a conversion of the per-unit-of-service units here to obtain the "quantity" per-unit-of-product in terms of which observations will be made.
The curve S(1) represents supply of the product of a given quality
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(here duration). The higher durability is not preferred because it costs
more, as reflected in the higher S(2) supply curve. When the mandate
(say a warranty) is imposed, the supply curve for lower quality shifts
upward by more than the supply curve for higher quality, leaving
SW(2) lower than, and hence preferred to, SW(1). As can be seen, on a
per-unit-of-service basis, the new equilibrium quantity is higher and
price is lower than we would expect with rigid quality
(QW(2) > QW(1); PW(2) < PW(1)).

But now consider what happens if we measure "quantity" on a
per-unit-of-product basis, as the legal rule does. This will be quite
normal, because the legal rule will reflect the least costly understanding of how to measure the product. When higher quality will result in
a need for fewer units-as it clearly does in the case of increased durability 5-the apparent quantity and price shift will be greater than
they are on a per-unit-of-service basis. That is, if as is the case in Figure
8, the new high quality is a durability 50 percent greater than that of
the product in the pre-mandate equilibrium, the quantity QW(2) will
appear the same as quantity QW*(1) measured on a per-unit-ofproduct basis, even though QW(2) is 1.5 times QW*(1) measured on a
per-unit-of-service basis. For example, if QW(2) is 150 service units,
these units are packaged in "product units" that are more durable and
so will seem to be 100 "product units." Thus the 150 service units of
QW(2) will "look like" the 100 service units of QW*(l), which are
packaged in a way that looks like 100 "units" for purposes of the statute. If we fall to distinguish units of differing durabilities, then QW(2)
will appear to equal QW*(1): each represents 100 "units." Likewise
the price PW(2) will be concentrated on higher quality units and will
appear the same as a price for low-quality units of PW*(1), even
though PW*(1) is 1.5 times the price PW(2) measured on a per-unitof-service basis.
Thus, high quality price and quantity ((PW(2), QW(2)) will look
deceptively like the prices for a low quality item (PW*(1), QW*(1)),
and, importantly, the latter could have resulted from a demand shift
under an assumption of constantquality. The data on price and quan-

tity could reflect (PW*(1), QW*(1)), which would result from a shift
upwards in demand from D to D* as indicated by the intersection of
SW(1) (the rigid-quality upwardly-shifted supply curve) and the hypothetical demand curve D*. That is, unless quality is measured in a
more fine-grained way than the legal rule provides for, the case of increased quality but an unvalued warranty will look the same as that of
a somewhat valued warranty on a product of rigid quality. When the
135 Similarly in the case where one high-quality unit provides services at a faster rate than a
lower-quality unit.
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two cases will look alike, the area of the box ABCD will equal that of
the box CEFQ and vice versa.136
Not all cases will result in such an exact equivalence. But the
closer the two boxes are in area, the easier will be confusion between
the rigid- and variable-quality analyses. Furthermore, the more error
in empirical studies of the pre- and post-mandate market data, the
more the confusion illustrated here will arise in approximate fashion.
Finally, in actual cases, even more will be going on. The choice will not
be between an analysis of a valueless warranty with variable product
quality and ati analysis in terms .of warranty value with rigid quality.
Instead, often there will be a mixture of a demand shift due to value
from the warranty and a quality shift to avoid its excess costs. Telling
how much each effect contributes to the observed data will be challenging.
The situations of valued mandates and quality shifts from relatively unvalued mandates are theoretically distinguishable, but in
practice the evidence will be difficult to interpret. I return to this question and its implications for welfare and equity,'6 but for now note that
there are two main ways to tell the difference and neither is likely to
be straightforward. First, more sophisticated econometric techniques
might be brought to bear on the data, but this would make large informational demands." Second, under the assumptions used here, in
the case of a shift to increased quality where the mandate is not valued overall, we do expect a decrease in quantity, which could theoretically be used to help disambiguate the data. In the case of the valued
warranty, we expect an increase in quantity. But, again, the problem is
the measurement costs in defining units for quantity analysis. Further,
policymakers, seeking to avoid a large allocational impact from a legal
rule, will tend to choose commodities and services that have a relatively inelastic. supply. If so, the quantity shift will be difficult to spot,
particularly where other factors bearing on supply and demand will
infect the data used.
The problem more generally is that identifying the relevant supply and demand curves is difficult to begin with, but with variable
quality this problem becomes much more so. Furthermore, the market
leaves some margins unpriced (although reflected in price) and the

136 The quantities and prices will appear exactly the same in the low and high quality cases
when CD = a x CG and GF = CE = a x DB = a x AC (where a is some constant). If so, then AC =
la x GF and the area of the box ABCD is CD x AC = (a x CG) x (la x GF) = CG x GF, which
is the area of the box CEFG. Conversely, where the two points appear equal when measured by

physical units (rather than by unit of service), the ratios CGICD and CAICE will be equal, making the areas of the boxes equal.
137 See Part V.A.
138 See notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
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lawmaker leaves some margins unspecified in laws and regulations for
the same reason: that it is costly to measure such attributes, important
though they are. The more costly such margins are to measure, the
more difficult they will be to incorporate into an econometric analysis
of the effect of the legal mandate.
B.

Ambiguities in Liability Rules

Similarly, quality changes can cause liability rules to look deceptively attractive. Where it is relatively costly to measure an attribute
that can be increased in response to a pricing instrument (Pigovian
tax, liability rule), quantity will fall less than it would under rigid quality. In Figure 6, Q7, the quantity in response to the tax on A-type pollution, is to the right of Q*, which would be the quantity if A is taxed
and no shift to B is possible. One of the reasons that a tax or a liability
rule may be chosen is officials' lack of knowledge of where the control
cost (marginal benefit) curve lies. When in response to a Pigovian tax
or liability rule, quantity falls only to Q, rather than all the way to Q*
(because of a shift to B), this may be taken as a sign that control costs
are higher than previously thought, i.e. that CC, is really higher such
that it intersects the S(T) A curve at quantity Qr If so, then the quantity regulation looks deceptively bad. If the optimal point were really
at Q, as the liability-rule proponent will now believe, then the amount
that the official would have selected ex ante for quantity regulation,
Q, looks even more off the mark than it really is: Q, - Q, > Q* - Q,
Ex post, the official will take the fall to Q, as evidence that the informational-subset argument worked and very distortive quantity regulation was thereby avoided.
Again, this does not show that property rules and quantity regulation beat liability rules always or even often. What this does suggest
is that situations in which indirect quality changes are significant can
call for property rules to play some role (alone or in a hybrid scheme).
The possibility of indirect quality changes also suggests that where
they are important, they will be difficult to ferret out. As in the case of
the mandated product enhancement, indirect quality changes in the liability rule arena cause ambiguities in the data that are likely to be
used to assess ex post how well the legal rule is working.
V.

IMPLICATIONS AND APPLICATIONS

Variable quality has additional implications for the analysis of legal rules. In this part, I will focus mainly on these implications for
mandates in the buyer-seller context. First, the possibility that price
and quantity movements may be motivated by cost-avoiding shifts in
quality rather than, or in addition to, shifts in demand makes the data

2000]

Ambiguous Quality Changes

more difficult to interpret. Price rises cannot simply be taken as evidence of value placed on the mandate by the marginal consumer
without knowing either that adjustments along various quality margins are not possible or that such adjustments can be accounted for
econometrically. Neither prospect is all that likely. Unpriced margins
abound, precisely because attributes of commodities and services are
costly to measure. Further, in many cases a margin of adjustment that
corresponds to a costly measurement for transactors will present corresponding or greater measurement costs and information problems
for those designing legal rules.
A.

Efficiency and Distribution

First, in both the per-unit and ad valorem cases, the welfare loss
and incentive effects of the rules might be different from those anticipated by the lawmaker. The ambiguities in the data make adjustment
in these forecasts difficult. The danger will be that a quality change
will look like a welfare gain (or non-loss) to the extent there is a price
rise (more-than-full, full, or partial), whereas it actually may reflect
the legal-rule analog of tax avoidance through quality change. The
welfare implications of such quality changes are ambiguous too: the
welfare-loss triangle is less than it would be for the corresponding tax,
but to this must be added the loss involved in producing a nonoptimal
product or service (where optimality is measured by the pre-mandate
equilibrium). We may be confronted with a situation that is open to interpretation as market failure with high consumer valuation for the
mandate ex post or as an efficient market that is consuming resources
to avoid the costs of an unvalued legal mandate. In the most extreme
cases, a welfare gain under market failure can be confused with a welfare loss from quality changes. The two situations are quite different,
but price rises and quality changes will be ambiguous between these
two "readings." Theoretically, additional sophistication in the
econometric tools used to interpret this ambiguous data can resolve
the ambiguity. As I discuss later, there is little reason to be confident
about the ability of these econometric tools to do so. But for now, notice that margins of adjustment may present difficulties for the
econometrician for the same reasons that they are left unpriced by unregulated transactors in market equilibrium: attributes are costly to
measure. Indeed, the measurement of quality in the course of
econometric studies is recognized as at least a difficult and often an
unsolvable problem.
Similarly, ambiguities and difficulties arise with respect to the distributional consequences of legal rules. An analysis incorporating
variable quality does not change the basic points made by Craswell
and others about distribution, but it does have implications for how
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data are treated.'9 To the extent that quality changes can confuse demand shifts based on the marginal consumer, it will be all the more
difficult to tell whether the inframarginal consumer values the product
more than, less than, or the same as the marginal consumer."* In fact, if
one wanted to test by (artificial or natural) experiment the demand by
nonmarginal consumers, quality changes will present similar problems
for analyzing the behavior of these consumers as was the case for the
marginal consumers.
Moreover, if we drop the assumption of homogeneous buyers, we
have to face the possibility that the poor and the rich may have different costs.of adjustment along the various margins. That is, the shadow
price of quality may differ for consumers in different socioeconomic
groups. -Thus, a quality shift that benefits the marginal consumer by
saving more in tax-like cost than it costs in terms of lower overall
product Value may destroy consumer surplus for inframarginal consumers. The distributional problems facing a lawmaker where consumers of different wealth levels have heterogeneous tastes carries
over into the area of variable quality as well.
B.

More Complex Cases of Legal Rules

Legal rules, unlike taxes, can impose costs on unspecified margins.
They can impose these costs in a per-unit manner, an ad valorem
manner, or somewhere in between. Costs may be imposed in one
fashion on one margin but in a different manner on another margin.
This section highlights some of the possibilities beyond the product
warranty context. Examples are drawn from the law of punitive damages and from mandated health coverage in the employment relation.
1. Punitive damages.
Legal rules providing for punitive damages as a remedy may partially impose their costs on an ad valorem basis. In the tax context,,
Barzel notes that the corporate income tax is fundamentally an ad
valorem tax in the sense that it can be partially evaded by substituting
139 Craswell, 43 Stan L Rev at 377-85 (cited in note 1).
140 For a discussion of how monopoly in an aspect of product quality can interfere with the
ability of price to convey information about inframarginal consumers? valuation of quality, see A.
Michael Spence, Monopoly, quality, and regulation,6 Bell J of Econ 417,421,428-29 (1975). Producers' incentives to provide efficient packages in fight of inframarginal consumers' valuations
can be affected by economies of scale that prevent satisfaction of diverse preferences. See, for
example, Kelvin Lancaster, Variety, Equity, and Efficiency: ProductVariety in an IndustrialSociety 65 (1979); Craswell, 43 Stan L Rev at 373 n 20 (cited in note 1); Avinash K. Dixit and Joseph
E. Stiglitz, Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity, 67 Am Econ Rev 297
(1977); Michael Spence, ProductDifferentiation and Welfare, 66 Am Econ Rev (Papers & Proceedings) 407 (1976).
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towards debt financing and away from equity."' A similar point has
been made recently by Boyd and Ingberman in the context of punitive
damages.1 4 2 They note that firms can reduce expected liability by either
increasing safety in accordance with the law's purpose or by shifting
from equity to debt financing. When firms avoid the cost of the legal
rule in the latter fashion, punitive damages have less deterrent effect
than expected. That is, where capital investment is endogenous to the
legal rule, adjustment may take place along this margin rather than
the one envisioned by the lawmaker. In our terms, punitive damages
have an ad valorem cost effect: the expected liability is roughly proportionate to the amount of equity capital. If so, the deterrencelessening effect on punitive damages is a case of the expected tendency under legal rules that impose costs on an ad valorem basis; a
decrease in quality, here a decrease in equity capital, is expected to result.'4

2. Employer mandates and behavioral law and economics.
Another complex case of ambiguity arises in the employment
context. Sunstein, Jolls, and Thaler cite as support for the endowment
effect a study by Jonathan Gruber of the wage and employment effects for female workers after the introduction of mandatory maternity health coverage.'" The results of the study are consistent with the
passing on to the female workers of 100 percent or more of the costs
of the mandate, in the form of lower wages.4 5 That is, the confidence
intervals of most of the regressions that yielded statistically significant
results included values "reflecting" full shifting, somewhat less than
full shifting, and much more than full shifting.'4 Sunstein, Jolls, and
Thaler point to this as a possible example of the endowment effect:
pre-mandate wages reflect lower willingness to pay and post-mandate
wages reflect a higher value for the new "endowment." Of course, selection effects could explain this result even without invoking the endowment effect. 4 7 As Posner elaborates, women might be attracted to
141 Barzel, 84 J Pol Econ at 1185 n 14 (cited in note 6). Barzel also notes that as a result equity holders will bear more risk and that the corresponding rise in the rate of return will look

like the shifting of the tax. In some cases the rise in the rate of return might exceed the tax rate,
appearing like a more than 100 percent shift. Id.
142 James Boyd and Daniel E. Ingberman, Do Punitive Damages Promote Deterrence?, 19
Intl Rev L & Econ 47,48 (1999).
143 That is,
if equity is treated as specified attribute A and debt as unspecified attribute B,
the cost on A leads to less of A and more of substitute B.

Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler,50 Stan L Rev at 1505-08 (cited in note 3).
Id at 1506; Gruber, 84 Am Econ Rev at 623,630-37 (cited in note 27).
Jolls Sunstein, and Thaler, at 1506 (cited in note 3); Gruber, 84 Am Econ Rev at 638
(cited in note 27).
147 Gruber, 84 Am Econ Rev at 626 n 9 (cited in note 27); Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, 50 Stan
144
145
146
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jobs covered by such laws (or attracted to employment over home
production), which would compete down wages, and women might be
more likely to have children, which would reduce the value of their
labor to the employer and lower their wages.14-

But these possible selection effects are not the only reason that
the Gruber results are ambiguous. Variable quality changes may magnify selection effects or, in some cases, even operate independently of
them. To simplify for exposition, labor has three attributes: worker
identity, hours, and difficulty of task (or skill level). As noted earlier, a
legal rule can impose a cost in different ways on different attributes,
not all of which need have been specified or even foreseen by the
lawmaker. Thus, it is possible for a legal rule to be designed to impose
a per-worker flat cost, i.e., on the first attribute, but it may impose an
ad valorem cost on the third attribute, skill level. In the case of the
Gruber study, if increased pregnancies lead to increased leaves by
women, the companies may invest less in their training or entrust
fewer long-term projects to them. This would lower'wages. Moreover,
this quality-reducing effect can even occur without the selection effects (for increased pregnancies) emphasized by Posner. Consider a
mandate (not necessarily like those in the Gruber study).9 that included mandatory leave for childbirth. Even if no selection effect existed-no endogenous increased pregnancies-the cost to the employer of this mandate might well be ad valorem: the missed days of
more skilled and high-level employees with important firm-specific
human capital will impose greater costs than those of less skilled employees entrusted with less complex tasks. If so, the mandate may impose costs partly on an ad valorem basis, which would tend to favor
decreased quality by, for example, employing more less-skilled female
workers and fewer high-skilled female workers. This would result in
lower wages, even in the absence of endowment or selection effects."O
The lesson here is not that employer mandates for childbirth are
a bad idea. What it does suggest is that, in comparing the various types
of mandates and subsidies, endogenous quality along margins like
training and task level can be important.'5 Likewise, the costs of
L Rev at 1507 (cited in note 3); Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, BehavioralEconomics, and

the Law, 50 Stan L Rev 1551,1568-70 (1998).
148 Posner, 50 Stan L Rev at 1569 (cited in note 147).
149
150

The exact contours of the legal rules that Gruber studied are not clear.
The Gruber study finds a rise in hours, a drop in employment and little overall effect in

labor input quantity. Gruber, 84 Am Econ Rev at 634 (cited in note 27). All this is consistent with
an endogenous quality effect if more unskilled labor is required and the mandate imposes a per

unit component of costs as well.
151 That there are many margins along which the parties to an employment relation can
adjust should be underlined to the extent that workers receive compensating differentials; these
are wage differences that reflect the ways in which the fringe benefits of a job differ from the
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measuring quality will factor into the choice among solutions to the
quality problem. For example, if the policy for childbirth coverage is
important enough, the possibilities are. several. One possibility, is to
acknowledge the cost in terms of employment but consider that coverage is worth it. Alternatively, the skill level of female workers might
have to be specified and monitored, which would be quite difficult.
Antidiscrimination law could be used to remedy gender-specific assignment of tasks, which would require measurement of task levels.
Or, in the case of mandatory leave, men might be required to take the
leave as well. More generally, it is an empirical and policy question
whether endogenous quality effects are great enough to matfer, and
what solution is called for will likewise depend in part on measurement costs. Measurement costs are relevant to the choice of whether
and how to intervene in markets.
C. Measurement Problems
Endogenous quality is a challenge for those designing legal rules
for the same reason that not all attributes are priced in an unregulated
market: measurement is costly. In the evaluation of legal rules, empirical studies are correspondingly difficult. In econometric terms, variable quality along multiple margins causes difficult identification
problems. Once variable quality is a possibility, identifying the supply
curve (or curves) will be difficult because quality is hard to measure.
Theoretically, one could use the method of hedonic prices to calculate
implicit prices of attributes based on price-quantity observations of
multiple goods with different levels of the attribute,512 but this method,
norm and that help the market clear. See, for example, W.Kip Viscusi, FatalTradeoffs: Publicand
Private Responsibilitiesfor Risk 65 (Oxford 1992); John H. Goddeeris, Compensating Differentials and Self-Selection: An Application to Lawyers, 96 J Pol Econ 411 (1988); Jonathan Gruber
and Brigitte C. Madrian, Health InsuranceandJob Mobility: The Effects of Public Policy on JobLock, 48 Indus & Lab Rel Rev 86 (1994); Sherwin Rosen, The Theory of EqualizingDifferences,

in Orley Ashenfelter and Richard Layard, eds, 1 Handbook of Labor Economics 641 (NorthHolland 1986). But see Peter Dorman and Paul Hagstrom, Wage Compensationfor Dangerous

Work Revisited, 52 Indus & Lab Rel Rev 116 (1998).
152

See, for example, Sherwin Rosen, Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: ProductDiffer-

entiation in Pure Competition,82 J Pol Econ 34 (1974) (presenting a model for determining hedonic prices); Timothy J. Bartik, The Estimationof Demand Parametersin Hedonic PriceModels,

95 J Pol Econ 81 (1987) (criticizing the Rosen-Freeman hedonic price model and presenting an
alternative); Dennis Epple, Hedonic Pricesand Implicit Markets: Estimating Demand and Supply

Functionsfor DifferentiatedProducts,95 J Pol Econ 59 (1987). For some of the many attempts to
apply the method of hedonic prices to the housing market, see, for example, Werner Z. Hirsch,
Effects of Habitability and Anti-Speedy Eviction Laws on Black and Aged Indigent Tenant
Groups: An Economic Analysis, 3 Intl Rev L & Econ 121, 133 n 24 (1983); Werner Z. Hirsch,
Habitability Laws and the Welfare of Indigent Tenants, 63 Rev Econ & Stat 263 (1981); Ann D.

Vitte, Howard J. Sumka, and Homer Erekson, An Estimate of a StructuralHedonic PriceModel
of the Housing Market:An Application of Rosen's Theory of Implicit Markets, 47 Econometrica

1151 (1979).
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even where it might apply, requires data on more packages than the
' In practice this will often be difficult, if
quality attributes in question.53
not prohibitively so. The problems of identification or the construction
of hedonic prices are greater if quality changes are an "evasion technique" for legal rules; it becomes more difficult to identify the supply
curve or to specify hedonic prices when quality may respond to
changes in legal rules and taxes. The more such margins there are, the
more difficult the problem is.
Likewise, endogenous quality changes, when they occur, are
caused by the legal rule and are thus expected to occur at the same
time as the other price and quantity effects of the rule. There is no
reason to expect a difference in timing to allow one to tell the difference between cost-evading quality changes and other demand-shifting
factors stemming from the legal rule.
The issues here may be illustrated using one of the best-studied
areas of the effects of legal rules, housing codes. Here quality is key, in
an obvious way: the code designers are worried about "low-quality"
housing. Thus, price alone is not enough for the evaluation of the efficiency and distributional impact of such rules. However, in the many
studies that have been done, quality has been addressed less than convincingly. The most promising approach has been that of implicit or
hedonic prices just mentioned, but many problems remain, including
biases from omitted variablesl Quality dimensions that are difficult
to measure can lead to such biases, and quality is directly related to
the question of how many dimensions should be used to measure
market segmentation. n
In general, studies evaluating legal rules tend to look at quality
dimensions foreseen by the lawmakers. Thus, for housing, such studies
will include, at most, variables for aspects such as completeness of
153 Leffler, 72 Am Econ Rev at 965-66 (cited in note 6).
154 See, for example, David Dale-Johnson, An Alternative Approach to Housing Market
Segmentation Using Hedonic Price Data, 11 J Urban Econ 311 (1982); Robert Halvorsen and
Henry 0. Pollakowski, Choice of FunctionalForm for HedonicPriceEquations,10 J Urban Econ
37 (1981) (reporting on a study of 5727 single-family owner-occupied homes in the San Francisco
Bay Area involving seven variables); Peter Linneman, Some EmpiricalResults on the Nature of
the HedonicPriceFunctionfor the Urban HousingMarket, 8 J Urban Econ 47 (1980) (analyzing
1973 American Housing Survey data involving thirty variables but recognizing that some important variables were not available); Michael P.Murray, Hedonic Prices and Composite Commodi-

ties, 5 J Urban Econ 188 (1978) (defending traditional housing service model while recognizing
the limits of the hedonic price approach); Raymond B. Palmquist, Measuring EnvironmentalEffects on Property Values without Hedonic Regressions,11 J Urban Econ 333 (1982). See also, for
example, James N. Brown and Harvey S. Rosen, On the Estimation of StructuralHedonic Price
Models, 50 Econometrica 765,767 (1982) (arguing that "marginal 'prices' constructed only from
quantities do not in themselves add any information to that already provided by observations on
quantities" and that the additional information must come from prior restrictions on functional
form).
155 See, for example, Dale-Johnson, 11 J Urban Econ at 313 (cited in note 154).
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plumbing, exposed wires, etc.,'5 but not aspects like length of lease, the
extent to which late rental payments are tolerated, sound buffering,
etc. But other quality dimensions seemingly unrelated to the legal rule
in question may be used to evade the cost of the legal rule, along the
lines discussed earlier. Thus, to take a purely hypothetical example,
consider a housing code that imposes some costs that do not vary
much if at all with the length of the lease. This could happen in several
ways. First, a code could make landlords responsible for ensuring no
floor tiles are cracked or missing (or any other similar damage). Suppose tenants would be responsible for tiles they themselves damaged
during the term of the lease and that such damage tends to go unreported during the term. Renting to irresponsible tenants whose security deposits may not cover full damage would under such a code entail a roughly per-unit cost for each lease: the fix-up costs would be a
per-unit cost regardless of the length of the lease. Second, the code
might regulate and impose costs on the process of turnover itselft for
example by giving a right to damages to new tenants whose apartments are not ready on time. Third, the code might impose costs on a
per-lease basis by, for example, making it the landlord's duty to ensure
that certain higher standards are met at the beginning of a lease. This
could also occur where enforcement of a standard that theoretically
applied at all times tended to occur at the beginning of leases.
Such per-unit-here per-lease-costs might be partially evaded
by lengthening the period of the lease, somewhat like the longerlasting light bulbs or longer cigarettes enabled transactors to partially
evade a per-unit excise tax. As noted earlier, tenants might value the
uncracked tiles somewhat, so the analogy to the excise tax should not
be pushed too far. But, to the extent that the repair is valued by the
marginal tenant at less than its marginal cost, the tax-like excess cost
can lead to quality changes-here a lengthening of lease terms-that
avoids some of this excess cost.
Note too that such quality effects, to the extent that they occur,
have implications for efficiency and distribution. The legal rule will
cause a loss from more costly production, but a lesser deadweight loss
triangle, and will have less of its intended impact. Also, not only will
tenants value the improvement in quality envisioned by the lawmaker
differently, but different tenants may place different value or bear different costs from the cost-evading quality improvement. In the example, some tenants may find longer leases more inconvenient than does
the marginal tenant.
The result of these measurement difficulties is often an excessive
focus on price alone. To return to the area of excise taxes, one would
156 See, for example, Hirsch,3 Intl Rev L & Econ at 134 nn 25-28 (cited in note 152).
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think that sales of cigarettes would not be overly difficult to study; certainly cigarettes are much less complex commodities than housing.
But here empirical support for the theory of taxation based on variable quality had to await an approach that went beyond crude assumptions of price response. Many studies in the last 20 years purporting to refute Barzel's theory of taxation relied on price alone. Because of limited data on even such a seemingly simple commodity,
authors measured product quality indirectly using data on the price of
packs of cigarettes.'' But the introduction of generic cigarettes allowed a natural experiment, and it appears that indeed per-unit taxes
lead to an increase in cigarette quality and that ad valorem taxes have
a different effect.m
Likewise, in evaluations of the possible role played by framing effects, price has been the primary focus. If framing is to explain price
increases, we should expect quantity increases as well, but flat or
slightly declining quantity is taken as consistent with framing.' 5' If so,
quantity is not going to distinguish between competing interpretations
of the data.
This focus on price is understandable, if regrettable. First, in a
competitive market there will be little variation in price, making price
much easier to measure than total quantity sold (which requires tallying up units across a market). Further, as we have seen, the quantity
effects expected may not be large; if so, the quantity effects that one
would expect from cost-evasion through variable quality might differ
so little from the quantity effects expected where consumers value the
legal mandate that the difference is drowned out in statistical noise.
This will be all the easier the closer the case comes to the double ambiguity-of both price and quantity-set out above in Part IV.A.
A small quantity effect is especially to be expected in the area of
taxes and legal rules because proposals have typically focused on
situations where "supply" is-or is thought to be-relatively inelastic.
It is thought that where supply is relatively inelastic, decisionmaking
will be least affected and distortions correspondingly smaller."' Not
157

See Sobel and Garrett, 105 J Pol Econ at 881-82 (cited in note 7).

Id at 881-83.
159 Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, 50 Stan L Rev at 1506 (cited in note 3).
158

160 This is true both of the Ramsey rule in the optimal taxation literature, Frank P. Ramsey,
A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 Econ J 47 (1927) (proposing inverse-elasticities
rule), and of proposals for legal rules. For example, Ackerman's argument for the potential desirability of housing codes rested in part on the relatively inelastic supply of housing. Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets On Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Code4s Housing
Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 Yale L J 1093, 1102-03, 1117 (1971) (setting out

initial analysis including inelastic supply and noting that more government provision of lowincome housing will be required the more that reality deviates from this assumption); Bruce
Ackerman, More on Slum Housing and Redistribution Policy: A Reply to ProfessorKomesar,82
Yale L J 1194 (1973). But see, for example, Neil K. Komesar, Return to Slumville: A Critique of
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only is an exclusive focus on price and "passing on" of costs (observed
in judicial opinions) inappropriate because demand may shift, ' the
focus on price can obscure the effects of quality adjustment. Thus, the
class of econometric problems posed by legal rules (and taxes) is not
randomly chosen. Inelastic supply will lead the quantity effects to be
small regardless of their source and the price effects to be relatively
larger. Thus, although theoretically "quantity" effects could sometimes
help decide whether we are dealing with framing effects and arguably
increased efficiency or with evasion and a welfare loss, in practice they
do not.
And, as we have seen, a focus on price alone is subject to ambiguities. Is a price rise the effect of a per-unit cost along some margin
or the result of consumer valuation (for framing or other reasons)? Is
a price drop the result of an ad valorem cost or lack of consumer
valuation? And most disturbingly of all, what combination of these
four possibilities lies behind the overall rise or fall that we actually
see?
The key is what margins to look for and the cost of measuring
them. Studies evaluating the "quality" effects of legal rules-to the extent that they exist-tend to look first to price effects and then to
crude measures of the quality margins most related to what the lawmakers had in mind. Of course, these tend to be ones that are easier to
measure. The problem is even greater for legal rules than it is for taxes
because legal rules can impose costs on unspecified margins.
CONCLUSION

Measurement costs are whaf lead to attributes being unpriced,
untaxed, and unregulated. Although transactors' and lawmakers' costs
may not be the same, often they will be similar enough for the set of
margins that is left unspecified by market price, by tax statute, and by
legal rule to be similar. Even the question of how the world is carved
up into "products" and "activities" is partly a function of measurement costs. It is doubtful that the analyst will often have the information at a worthwhile cost when the market does not.

the Ackerman Analysis of Housing Code Enforcement and the Poor,82 Yale L J 1175 (1973);
Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 514-18 (cited in note 83) (arguing that rent supplements
are superior to housing codes in improving the stock of housing for the poor). See also Richard
S. Markovits, The Distributive Impact, Allocative Efficiency, and Overall Desirability of Ideal
HousingCodes: Some TheoreticalClarifications,89 Harv L Rev 1815,1818-27 (1976).
161 Craswell points out that Judge J. Skelly Wright, in using (and citing) Ackerman's article,
took the extent to which costs could not be passed on as an index of tenant net benefit. Craswell,
43 Stan L Rev at 383 & n 35 (cited in note 1), citing Robinson v DiamondHousing Corp, 463 F2d
853,860 (DC Cir 1972).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[67:647

As we have seen, the analogy between legal rules and taxes can
provide additional insights, once we allow for variable quality. Legal
mandates are unlike taxes in sometimes providing buyers with
nonzero value as well as cost. But to the extent that the mandate is not
cost justified, it can lead to cost-evading quality adjustments. The set
of possible adjustments to legal rules properly includes those in response to the corresponding tax. And the adjustments themselves lead
to ambiguities, for example where quantity and (especially) price
changes could reflect an outward shift in demand or a cost-evading increase in quality.
Similarly, where measurement of the possible components of an
externality-generating activity are differentially costly to measure,
simple informational-subset arguments for Pigovian taxes and liability
rules cannot be maintained without qualification. Rather, the question
is an empirical one, and the data used ex post to evaluate the pricing
of externalities can be subject to ambiguities from indirect quality effects.
Generally, adjustment to taxes and legal rules can occur along
margins that are unspecified and which allow for cost evasion. Often
the costs of measurement are what cause margins to be unpriced by
the market. The history of empirical study of quality changes in response to excise taxes illustrates only some of the problems involved.
In the case of legal rules aimed at product enhancement or externalities, quality adjustments along such margins will cause the data used
for ex post evaluation to be at least as, if not more, ambiguous than
those used to evaluate excise taxes. Correspondingly, endogenizing
quality is potentially important in evaluating the desirability of a legal
rule.

Most basically, we need to know if a price rise corresponds to an
adjustment for per-unit costs on the one hand or reflects consumer or
social value on the other. Similarly, a price drop will raise the possibility of a cost-evading drop in quality or a drop in consumer valuation.
Most importantly, we need to distinguish between these four possibilities-and along a number of margins. The possibilities become very
numerous and hard to disentangle. Moreover, induced quality changes
have implications both for efficiency and for distribution. Particularly
where a legal rule is designed to benefit a socioeconomic group, it is
necessary to have some idea about whether the quality change that responds to the desires of the marginal consumer has the same or different impact on inframarginal consumers.
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APPENDIX

In this appendix, I present a more formal version of the arguments in Part II of the text and extend Barzel's model of excise taxation to the complex case of a mandated product enhancement.
A.

Per-Unit Legal Rules

In the pre-mandate equilibrium, for all attributes i = 1, ... , n, the
marginal contribution of the attribute to the value and to the cost of
the commodity (denoted MVC, and MCC, respectively) are equal
(MVC = MCC). I assume that marginal cost with respect to quantity
is positive and increasing and marginal benefit is positive and decreasing over the relevant range. Normalizing the pre-tax level of each
attribute to one unit per unit of the commodity, and assuming additive
separability for the contributions of the attributes, we have
MCC

(1) MCC =
i=1

and

MVC .

(2) MVC =
i=1

The warranty will impose a marginal cost (MCW) consisting of
components that vary with the level of the other attributes (MCW,)
and a fixed cost once the product is chosen (MCW0), that is
MCW,

(3) MCW =
i=O

and correspondingly on the marginal value side
n

(4) MVW =

MV4i.
i=O

Now, with the imposition of the warranty, the new equilibrium
will be characterized by the equality of the sum of the marginal costs
of all the attributes (including the marginal cost of the warranty attribute) on the one hand and the sum of the marginal values of the attributes on the other:
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(5)

MCCv +
i=1
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n

_MCW + MCW = PW=
i=1
n

Mvc

n

+

i=1

MVW + MVW.
i=1

Note that for convenience I am writing MCW and MVW as sums
of their variable and fixed components.
As noted in the text, the situation here differs from that of a tax
in that (i) the effect of the warranty appears on both sides of equation
(5) because the legal rule can confer benefits (reflected in the two
marginal value terms on the right of the equation) and (ii) the levels
of the attributes of the pre-mandate commodity can affect the cost
and benefit of the warranty attribute, as reflected in the second terms
on each side of equation (5). As noted in the text, I focus on modeling
the interaction of the attributes with the warranty and abstract away
from similar effects among the non-warranty attributes.
We can simplify by reducing the specified and unspecified attributes to composite attributes A and B, respectively.'6' Equation (5) then
decomposes into the following:
v + MCWA + MCCW + MCW + MCW = pW
(6) MCCA

=

MVCAW + MVWA + MVCW + MVW. + MVW.
At this point, results depend on the relative sizes of the terms in
this equation. Most significantly, the issue is whether the warranty itself is less than, more than, or exactly cost justified.
1.

Non-cost-justified warranty.

In this first case, the marginal value of the warranty is less than its
marginal cost (MVW < MCW). Here variable quality can lead to ambiguity between a cost-evading quality shift and a shift outward in
demand.
Whenever the warranty is not cost-justified, it does act like a tax
in the sense that, under the assumptions adopted here, it will lead to a
decrease in the quantity of the commodity as a whole, which in turn
means that we move downward along the marginal cost curves of each
of the attributes:

162 See note 56 and accompanying text.
163

For the reasons for exploring an additive transformation of the supply schedules for the

attributes, see notes 53 and 57 and accompanying text.
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(7) MCCW < MCC = MVC, < MVCW for all i.
Now we consider some possible subcases.
a) The marginalcost and value of the warranty may be unaffected
by the level of the attributes,both specified and unspecified. That is, altering the level of the product's attributes does not affect the cost and
value of the warranty: MCW = MCWB = MVWA = MVW = 0. The
"direct" effect of quality on the cost and value of the warranty is nonexistent. In the toaster example, this is where improving the wiring
would cost more than it contributes to reducing the cost of the warranty.
If so, then the only quality effect is indirect, and we have a legal
rule that acts very much like the per-unit excise tax on light bulbs. In
the case of the legal rule, the "tax" is the amount by which the marginal cost of the warranty exceeds its marginal value. What is analogous here to the per-unit tax is the amount by which the marginal cost
of the warranty exceeds its marginal value (MCW - MVW). Given
equations (6) and (7) above, along with the assumption of MVW <
MCW for this scenario, we have:
(8) MCCW + MCW > MVC' + MVW
and
(9) MCCW < MVCW .
On the assumption of this scenario (MCW = MCWB = MVWA =
MVWB = 0), altering the levels of the other attributes of the product
does not affect the value of the warranty, and so the only reason to
change those levels is for the tax-avoiding reasons discussed in connection with the light-bulb case.4
For the specified attribute set (A), the warranty effectively sets a
minimum level and there is no incentive to increase it (see (8)). Adjustment then takes two forms: a reduction in quantity and an increase
in B relative to A, as discussed earlier. For example, unspecified durability (B) can be increased relative to the specified attributes that are
included in the definition of "toaster" (A). In addition, for the unspecified (B) attributes, the lower quantity has caused a move down
the attribute's marginal cost curve (MCCB) and up its marginal benefit
curve (MVC,). The amount of B will be increased until the marginal
cost of B equals its marginal value until an equilibrium is restored
(that is, until the inequality in (9) turns into an equality). Because adjustment takes the form of both a reduction in quantity and an in164

See text accompanying notes 33-34.
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crease in quality (the relative level of B increases), the reduction in
quantity need not be pursued as far as it would under rigid quality.
Thus, we would expect a tendency toward somewhat lower
"quantity" but higher levels of the unspecified attribute and hence a
higher price than expected in the rigid-quality framework.'o Thus, attributes, like durability, will be increased only insofar as they allow a
substitution against the tax. Again, where the legal rule has no value
to the consumer, the cost of the mandate does act like a tax, but with
variable quality this can lead to a price increase. Price will be higher
than expected on rigid quantity and can even exceed the pre-mandate
equilibrium price plus the cost of the warranty.
b) The contributionof the level of the unspecified attributesto the
marginalcost of the warranty is less than the contributionof the level of
those attributes to the marginalvalue of the warranty. That is, MCWB <
MVW. Here, there is an incentive to raise the level of the unspecified
attributes in order to make the warranty less costly or more valuable,
reinforcing the tendency toward higher quality just discussed under
subcase (a). This extra motive to increase quality is familiar from
products liability and is what I have labeled the "direct effect" on
quality. For example, we might expect that, in some cases, it will be cost
effective to increase product safety in response to a warranty in order
to make the warranty less costly. Alternatively, to the extent that consumers value the extra warranty coverage enough to exceed the cost
of the additional coverage, it is possible for the increase in quality to
enhance the value of the warranty. Particularly where there is no
choice but to have the warranty, the marginal consumer can value the
warranty in the presence of high quality more than with low quality,
even though the warranty-plus-high-quality package is valued less
than the no-warranty-low-quality package. In such a case, the premandate equilibrium will be no warranty and low quality and the
post-mandate equilibrium will be high quality plus warranty. This is
the case in which the net positive contribution that the level of B
makes to warranty value reinforces the cost-evading tendency to
higher quality. One example is increased safety in response to tort liability.
c) The contribution of the level of the specified attributes to the
marginalcost of the warranty is less than the contribution of the level of
those attributesto the marginalvalue of the warranty. That is, MCWa <
MVWA. Here, the specified attributes are net contributors to warranty
value and exert a pressure towards higher quality. Note that this can165 As for legal rules, perhaps in some ways a mandated pollution control device for automobiles comes closest to this most tax-like case. Altering the levels of other attributes of the car
does not increase or decrease the net cost of the device (its tax-like aspect).
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not happen in the case of a tax, which does not normally have value to
the consumer. The most interesting scenario is one in which this quality-increasing effect outweighs the unattractiveness of the specified attributes from the constraint of the legal rule. Given equation (8)
above, this will happen when
(10) MVWA - MCWA > MCCA+ MCWoMVCW

VW.

As a result, we get
(11) MVC W + MVWA + MVW > MCCW + MCW + MCW.
Increasing the level of the specified attributes might make the
warranty more valuable, but for this effect to matter, it has to call for a
level of A that clears the floor established by the rule.
In a way, this is more likely than in the previous subcase (in which
increasing the level of unspecified attributes made the warranty more
valuable) because officials might well have contemplated that these
attributes needed adjustment. But, as the literature on cheapest-costavoider under strict liability argues, one of the advantages to strict liability is that it allows the actor with the most information to adjust
along the appropriate margins.6 These margins need not even have
been foreseen by the lawmaker for the liability rule to work. Thus, this
case and the previous case are similar.
In the next subcases, (d) through (g), the marginal cost of the
warranty exceeds its marginal benefit as before, but in the case of an
attribute (unspecified or specified), we now compare the following:
the excess of the attribute's contribution to the marginal value of the
product over its contribution to the marginal cost on the one hand
and, on the other hand, the "tax-like" excess of the attribute's net contribution to the marginal cost of the warranty. That is, in deciding the
level of an attribute that is a net contributor of value to the product
proper and a net detractor of value through its interaction with the
warranty, we must compare the sizes of the two effects to decide the
direction of any quality change.
d) The unspecified attribute's net contribution of value to the
productexceeds its net contributionto the warranty'scost. That is,
(12) MVCB- MCCB > MCW-

MVW.

This case is not unlike the one in (a) above (where the attribute
did not contribute to warranty benefit or cost; that is, where MCWB =
MVW = 0), with the exception that the expected quality increase
166 See Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents at 135-73 (cited in note 46).
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from adding more B will not proceed as far as in that earlier case. This
is because the level of B will be increased only until (12) becomes an
equality. This will happen at a point earlier than in (9) of case (a)
above, because increasing the attribute not only increases the marginal value of the product proper but also increases the marginal cost
of the warranty. That is, when, as here, increasing the level of B both
increases the value of the product but also imposes a cost through the
warranty, the latter effect will cause the increase in B to stop short of
the point at which the costs and benefits in the product proper would
dictate.
e) The unspecified attribute's net contribution of value to the
product is smaller than its net contributionto the warranty's cost. That
is,
(13) MVCB - MCC < MCW - MVWB.
Here, in a reversal of the previous scenario, the negative warranty
effect dominates the positive product-proper effect. Correspondingly,
we expect a decrease in unspecified attributes, and a lowering of quality. This is interesting because it cannot happen in the case of a specific
excise tax. Whereas, in the case of a per-unit tax under the assumptions we are entertaining, we would never expect a decrease in unspecified attributes, this can happen in the case of a legal rule. We expect a quality decrease in the case where raising the amount of the unspecified attributes is more costly through its effect on the warranty
cost than it is beneficial as part of the product proper.
f, g) A specified attribute that is a net detractorof value from the
warranty can contribute (f) more or (g) less to the marginalvalue of the
product than it detractsfrom the marginalvalue of the warranty. Here
we are considering the relationship of the net contribution of the
specified attribute (A) to the value of the product and to the warranty
under the assumption that the net contribution of value to the warranty is negative. However, recall that, by (8) above, the level of A is
effectively constrained. As long as the legal rule does not allow the
level of A to fall and there is no incentive to raise it (as in these subcases), then the level of the specified attributes is not expected to
change."7
2. Cost-justified warranty.
Here the marginal value of the warranty equals or exceeds the
marginal cost (MVW > MCW). In these cases, demand shifts outward,
167 That is, in such cases, the legal rule and the excise tax behave similarly. See Barzel, 84 J
Pol Econ at 1181 (cited in note 6).
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but quality changes can occur if the (overall) cost-justified mandate
imposes costs on unspecified margins.
B.

Ad Valorem Legal Rules

The ad valorem legal rule imposes costs in proportion to the
amount of all attributes that happen to be in the "product," giving rise
to an incentive to hive off attributes to evade the tax. With costs at
rate cw and benefits
at rate v', for the product
as a whole we have:
n
n
(14) (1 + Cv)l MCCw = pW = (a+ v W)MVC w .
j=1

i=1

This can be expanded in several ways. First, we can break up the n
attributes into the constrained (A) and unconstrained (B) sets, as
above in the per-unit case. Further, unlike with a tax, the legal rule can
impose different costs for different attributes. Also, although I will not
pursue this in detail, the "tax rate" and "benefit rate" that an ad valorem legal rule applies to an attribute might well depend on the level of
that attribute: the cost and benefit rates are functions of the attribute
level.
(15) (1 + cw (A)) MCC v + (1 + cw (B)) MCCW = pW =
(1 + v "(A)) MVCA- + (I + v - (B)) MVCBAs with the ad valorem tax, the legal rule that imposes costs on
an ad valorem basis makes lower quality attractive; reducing levels of
B allows some of the cost to be avoided because B is only exposed to
the cost of the rule as part of the product. When value might exceed
the cost (v'> c),demand shifts outwards, but when the cost exceeds
the value (ce > vW), then the rule operates as a tax at the rate (cw - v ).
We expect that B will be decreased to avoid the cost of the rule as
long as any inconvenience of doing so is outweighed by the tax-like
cost saved. If the pre-mandate benefit from selling B as part of the
package (as opposed to separately) is less than
W,
(16) (c'- v )MCC~

then B may be dropped from the "product" completely. Thus, the legal
rule that imposes costs on an ad valorem basis tends to lead to lower
quality and lower price than expected on rigid quality.

